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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

October 31, 1980 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4

Cert to CA 6 (Lively,
Martin, and Peck; p.c.)

No. 80-332
RHODES

Federal/Civil

Timely

v.

CHAPMAN

1. SUMMARY: The question presented involves the propriety of
the DC's ruling that double celling in the Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility (SOCF) violated the Eighth Arnendmeent's
proscription against c~uel and unusual punishment.

2. Facts and Pr9._ceedings Below: This class action alleged

that numerous facets of institutional life at SOCF violated the
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Eighth Amendment.

Among the com~laints was one directed at the

practice of double celling prisoners in cells designed for single
occupancy and measuring between 63 and 68 square feet.
Approximately 1400 of the 2300 inmates were double celled.

The

institution was designed to hold only 1600 inmates and double
celling was requ1red to accomodate the larger than anticipated
inmate population.
SOCF was built in 1973.
first rate insitution.

The DC found it to be a modern,

Food services, ventilation, lighting,

plumbing, sanitation, law library and classroom facilities,
medical services, visiting privileges and guard to inmate ratio
were all adequate.

Due to the overcrowding, however, full time

jobs were not fully available, some inmates had had educational

C

opportunities delayed and the number of psychologists and social
workers had not increased with the increase in population.

There

was an increase in violence, but that was due to the size of the
prison population not to double celling.

The DC rejected all of

the prisoners' contentions except the allegation that double
celling violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment.

The factors which led the DC to

find a constitutional violation were:

(1) SOCF is a maximum

security prison housing individuals convicted of serious
felonies;

(2) The inmates at SOCF are long term; (3) SOCF was

holding 38% more prisoners than the prison's rated capacity; (4)
The cells were designed to hold one ~erson and the size of these
cells was incompatible with expert recommendations that there be
a minimum of fifty square feet per occupant; (5) A substantial

~---

___

.,.._,,

__..,.......,.._.,

-3number of prisoners were required to spend substanially all of
their time in the cells; ( 6) This double celling is not a
tempcrary measure.

The court ordered a reduction of the inmate

population by 25 persons per month until the ·population is
reduced to 1,700.

By the time the court entered this order the

population had already been . reduc'° to 2000.
In a brief per curiam, theVcA 6 affirmed.

That court

explained that the DC had not held that double celling was per se
unconstitutional.
.

~

The lower court's conclusion was directed only

to the facts of this case.

The findings of fact were not clearly

erroneous and the conclusions of law derived from those findings
were permissible.

3. Contentions: The petr phrases the question presented as
follows: "Whether the double celling of prison inmates
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment where the record
indicates that the practice does not depreve inmates of minimum
constitutional guarantees to adequate food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care and personal safety."

This phrasing

both begs the question and overly simplifies the DC holding.

The

core issue is whether double celling is constitutionally adequate
shelter in light of the factors considered significant by the DC.
Yet petrs attempt to press the argument that the DC has
formulated a per se constitutional rule invalidati ~g double
celling.

Accepting that premise, the argument is that the

holding is inconsis~ent with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
which disavowed the existence of a "one man, one c e ll" principle

-r· --
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in the due process clause and with numerous circuit court
opinions which have upheld double celling.

For example, in Hite

v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1977), the CA 4 specifically
held that double celling in cells designed for single occupancy
and measuring 65 square feet did not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment.
Resps counter that the DC's holding is based upon the
totality of the circumstances presented by these facts and is,
therefore, not in conflict with the rule of law announced by any
federal court.

In fact, Bell v. Wolfish, although relying on the

Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment since Bell
involved pretrial detainees, supports this approach:

(
'--

-·

While confining a given number of people in a
given amount of space in such a manner as to
cause them to endure genuine privations and
hardship over an extended period of time might
raise serious questions under the Due Process
Clause as to whether those conditions amounted to
punishment, nothing even approaching such
hardship is shown by this record.
441 U.S. at 542.
Similarly, the CA- 4 has not foreclosed the possibility that
double celling could violate the federal constitution:
In Hite v. Leeke we held that "double-celling,"
the housing of two prisoners in a cell initially
designed for single occupancy, was not itself a
violation of the Constitution. It, of course,
may be a relevant factor when other consequences
of overcrowding create deprivations or impose
unusual restrictions and disadvantages upon the
prison population.
Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378, 1380 (4th Cir. 1978)

(

'~

(en bane).
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4. Discussion:

The resps are correct that there is no

conflict in the circuits with respect to whether double celling
is per se unconstitutional.

Although in the prison context

courts have adopted various tests to assess the constitutional
implications of the alleged deprivations ( ~ ; shocks the
conscience or evolving standards of decency), when addressing a
particular problem such as double celling the question is framed
in terms of the totality of the circumstances.
conflict on this very generalized plane.

There is no

However, on the facts

of this case, the circuits may very well be in conflict as to the
appropriate result.

The CA 6 result certainly seems more

solicitous of prisoners' rights than does the CA 4 result in the
factually similar case of Hite v. Leeke.

This difference may be

due to the DC's reliance on an "evolving standards of decency"
approach to assessing the totality of the circumstances.

Yet,

the DC does cite language seeming to approve a shock the
conscience test.
quite odd.

Indeed, the DC opinion affirmed by the CA 6 is

From the DC's description of the prison and

recitation of the applicable law one is left with the definite
impression that the lower court is going reject the
constitutional challenge.

The conclusion that double celling at

SOCF violates the Constitution is at odds with the tenor of the
opinion.

The only factor that would seem to justify the

conclusion is that a substantial number of prisoners spend
substantially
all of their time in t~ese cells.
,
(

Yet the lower

court rejected petr's proposed solution of building dormitories

\

which would have alleviated this problem.

Thus it ~ay be that

_..,. ____ ,,_

.
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the DC was more concerned with overcrowding than with double
celling; but that is not the focus of the opinion.
Although I am sympathetic with the DC's view of optimal
prison conditions, I have doubts that federal law is meant insure
that all prisons meet the ideal standards proposed by penological
experts.

The Court may want to look .at this case as a vehicle to

define the scope of federal couit involvement in state prison
reform.

The DC's approach certainly opens the door for

continuing involvement . by federal courts so long as penological
philosophies continue evolve.

On the other hand, the absence of

a published CA opinion may make this case less than compelling.
The remedy imposed by the DC is not harsh.

C

There is a response and a reply as well as an amicu$ brief
from the State of Oregon urging the Court to grant the petn.
10/16/80
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December 12, 1980 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
Motion of Petitioners to be
Excused from Supplementing
the Record

No. 80-332
RHODES

v.
CA 6

CHAPMAN

SUMMARY:

.

.

~~f

The State o f Oh 10, seeks leave to disp~ with the

printing of parts of the joint appendix proposed by the resps, who ~
are proceeding ifp.
FACTS:

On Nov. 3, the Court granted cert to consider the scope

of federal court in vol vemen·t

in state prison reform and in particular

whether double celling in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(SOCF) violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel
\

and unusual punishment.

Petr argues that the DC formulated a per se

constitutional rule invalidating double celling and resps argue that
the DC's decision was based on the totality of conditions demonstrated

(

by the evidence.

/

2 -

Petr designated for the joint appendix the lower court
and its plan for compliance.

decisions

Resps seek to include more than 230

additional pages of material into the printed appendix at a cost to
petr of approximately $5,000.

Resps seek to include summaries of

evidence and specific pages of testimony and exhibits.
PETR'S CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that a printed appendix is

expensive and should be limited to the relevant pleadings and orders.
Petr alleges that the items designated by resps consist of "raw
evidence which was introduced to the trial court" and part of a
transcript from a remedy hearing conducted eight months after the
DC judgment.

Petr notes that all the items are included in the trial

record which will be on file with the Court.
RESPS' CONTENTIONS:

In their opposition, resps admit that the

items they designated are portirnsof the evidence and testimony presented at trial.

Resps argue that this evidence is necessary to

show the basis of the district court's decision and will form the
basis of their statement of the case.
DISCUSSION:

Although Rule 30.1(4) allows an appendix to contain

"any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the
court's attention," Rule 30.2 concludes with the following paragraph:

\

In making these designations, counsel should
include only those materials the Court should examine. Unnecessary designations should be avoided.
The record is on file with the Clerk and available
to the Justices, and courisel may refer in their
briefs and oral argument to relevant portions of
the record that have not been printed.
Normally the scope of the appendix is not a major issue as the cost
•
of the appendix may be taxed as costs in the case (Rule 30.3). How-

(

ever, where resps are proceeding ifp, petr is unlikely to recover
costs regardless of the Court's decision on the merits.

-

3 -

The issues that the Court appears to be interested in do not
necessitate that portions of the evidence before the trial court be
included in the appendix.

Therefore, I suggest that the motion be

granted.
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To:

February 24, 1981

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

C,i!~

Greg Morgan

No. 80-332:

Rhodes et. al v. Chapman et. al

Question Presented
The
celling

at

question
the

in

Southern

this
Ohio

case

is

whether

Correctional

doubleFacility

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
,the Eighth Amendment.

.(y)

·'

.
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Background
Petitioners are officials of the State of Ohio,
and one

is

Facility

the warden of

(SOCF), a maximum-security pentientiary built in

the early 1970's.

SOCF.

the Southern Ohio Correctional

As

a

Respondents are the 2300 prisoners in

class,

they

sued

under

u.s.c.

42

1983,

§

seeking injunctive and monetary relief for the conditions
of their confinement.

They claimed that "double-celling"

at SOCF subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of

the Eighth Amendment.

Purporting to decide

on the basis of the "totality of the circumstances,"
District Court for
J.)

held

that

the Southern District of Ohio

double

celling

at

SOCF

"overly

the

(Hogan,
and

on

7
I

balance .•• is unconstitutional."
The District Court listed five facts upon which ~
it

based

its

constitutional

celled respondents are "long
to

the court,

this

close confinement.

fact

decision.
term"

First,

the

prison

"design
share

now

contains

capacity."

approximately

problems

of

Second, more prisoners are housed in

SOCF than the prison was designed to hold.
the

According

prisoners.

can accentuate

double- ~

38

Third,
63

% more

prisoners

double-celled

square

feet

Specifically,

of

than

prisoners
living

its
must

quarters.

3•

•

The court found that several district courts and advisory
councils have

recommended no

square feet per prisoner.
spend

most

of

cellmates. 1
permanent

their

less

than approximately

55

Fourth, double-celled prisoners

time

in

their

cells

with

their

Fifth, double-celling at SOCF appears to be a

practice,

not

merely

a

temporary

measure

to

accommodate a sudden increase in prison population.
To remedy the constitutional violation that it
had

found,

the

District

Court

ordered

that

petitioner

reduce the inmate population at SOCF by 25 prisoners per
trv,,,,r- 2-'5 () Q
month until the population fell . to 1700 inmates.
The

-----.

·-·

'\

court held that petitioner could decide whether to comply
with

this

order

by

transferring

prisoners,

by

reducing

admissions, or by some other means.
On petitioner's appeal, the Court of Appeals for

/JC~

1 specifically, the District Court found that~% of the
double-celled prisoners are confined to their cells for
all but 2-6 hours per week.
As to the other 75 % of the
double-celled
prisoners,
the
court's
findings
are
ambiguous.
At one point in its opinion, the court found
tnat tnese prisoners are locked in their cells only for
the 9 1/2 hours between 9:00 pm and 6:30 am. Elsewhere in
the opinion, however, the court found that these prisoners
leave their cells for only 10 hours a day.
It suffices to
say that these double-celled prisoners spend much of their
time closely confined with each other.

.

4.

>

the Sixth Circuit affirmed by order.

That court rejected

petitioner's contention that the District Court had held
double-celling to be per se unconstitutional.
of

Appeals

stated,

"The

district

court

The Court

listed

in

its

opinion a number of considerations upon which it based its
finding

that double celling at the particular prison in

question is unconstitutional.

We do not read the opinion ~&,...-,,

as holding that double celling is unconstitutional under ~

all circumstances."

The Court of Appeals

then stated,

without reasoning, that the District Court's findings were
not clearly erroneous and that its conclusions of law were
reasonable.

Discussion
I find this case to be an easy one.
reversing

the

respondents

Court

have

of

failed

Appeals

on

to show that

SOCF is a "cruel" punishment.

---

show

that

'----------

double-celling

ground

that

double-celling at ~

My reasoning is as follows:

To be a "cruel" punishment,
must cause some harm.

the

I recommend

double-celling at

Respondents have failed to
causes

harm

at

SOCF.

The

District Court did not find any condition of confinement
that is worsen,e_d__b_e,c_a_u, s_e_ o__d_o_u_ 1_e_-_c_e_1_1ing( ; : ; ,· ~

~

<

5.

/)-(_
court I\ found
~

adequate.

that
conditions
at ,_
SOCF
generally
___
_ _ _ _ __ _ _
___
_ _ _ _ _are
_ __quite

The court that the food, plumbing, lighting and

--- --

""

ventilation

are

adequate

at

It

SOCF.

found

that

the

medical and dental care is adequate and that respondents
failed to prove any indifference to prisoners' needs.

It

found

to

that

no

prisoners

educational programs or

have

been

denied

the law library.

access

It found that

~

violence at SOCF has '\since double-celling

began;

but

it

also found that the increased violence only reflected an

----

------ -------

increase in population, not an effect of double-celling.
Similarly, it found that there were too few jobs available
for

prisoners,

but

it

did

not 'find

that

this

was

the

result of double-celling.

Simply stated, nothing in the

District

supports

Court's

opinion

the

conclusion

double-celling itself causes harm.
r---~
Given the absence of evidence

to

show

that

that

double-celling causes harm, I find petitioners irrefutable
when they argue that the District Court's opinion can only
be

read

to

hold

unconstitutional.

that

-

double-celling

is

per

se

The five facts upon which the District
.......

Court expressly· relied do not support a conclusion that
double-celling causes harm.
double-celled

prisoners

are

Each of the facts -- (i) that
"long

term"

prisoners;

(ii)

•

.

6•

•

•

that SOCF is populated 38 % over "design capacity;"
that

double-celled

living

quarters

prisoners

than

have

advisable;

less

square

that

(iv)

(iii)

feet

of

double-celled

prisoners spend most of their time in their cells; and (v)
that double-celling is not a temporary measure at SOCF -supports the theory that double-celling causes harm which
might

prove

~

to

be

both

cruel

and

simply is no proof of harm in this case.

--------

But

unusual.

there

As petitioner

contends, these five facts are "self-evident concomitants
of

double-celling"

_________,,

which

double-celling occurs.

ptobably

are

present

wherever

---------

Brief at 17.

Because there is no proof of harm in this case,
the District Court's judgment can only be affirmed on the
ground that double-celling qua double-celling is cruel and
unusual.

Such a

judgment would not be a constitutional

decision, but a decision about the merits of penological
means.

Furthermore,

decision

about

about

others.

one

I

see

no

penological

Thus,

if

the

way

to

measure
Court

celling is cruel and unusual under

distinguish
from

holds
the

a

that

a

decision
double-

circumstances of

this case, then the federal courts will be asked to review
any

number

of

double-celling

other
here,

penological
produce

measures

no demonstrated

which,

like

harm.

But

7.

see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
I

therefore would

hold

that

double-celling

at

SOCF does not violate the Eighth Amendment because it has
not been shown to cause harm at that prison.

This holding

leaves open the possibility that double-celling is cruel
and unusual in circumstances where it is proven to produce
harm.

See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).

believe
further

that

the

Court

contention

needs

about

to

the

evaluating prison conditions under

address
proper

I do not

petitioners'
standard

for

the Eighth Amendment.

Petitioners contend that prison conditions do not impose
cruel and unusual punishment so long as the State provides
prisoners with "the basic necessities of life."
18. 2

Brief at

Because double-celling has not been shown to cause

harm, there is no need to consider whether double-celling
that did cause harm would violate the Eighth Amendment if

2petitioner relies for this proposition on Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (CA5 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978), which held, "If the State furnishes its
prisoners
with
reasonably
adequate
food,
clothing,
shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, so
as
to
avoid
the
imposition
of
cruel
and
unusual
punishment, that ends its obligations under Amendment
Eight."
Accord, Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (CA2
1978), aff'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979).
'

.J ,'

·'

8.

the

State

nonetheless

were

found

to

provide

the

basic

necessities of life.3
The precedents of this Court do not require the
Court

to do more

"cruelty"
case,

in

Hutto

this
v.

than

hold

case.

Finney,

that

The
supra,

there

precedent
does

not

is

no

most

proof
like

of

this

articulate

any

legal standard that the Court must apply, even though the
Court held that "[c]onfinement in a prison •.•

is a form

of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards."
to

several

Id.,
prison

at 685.

That case involved challenges

conditions,

including

confinement

in

"isolation cells."

The Court's principal holding was that

the

violation,

constitutional

court,

supported

the

as

remedial

found
order.

by

the district
As

to

the

3 1n
any
event,
petitioner's
proposed
standard
is
unhelpful because it begs the question in this case.
By
asking whether a prison which double-cells inmates has
provided "adequate shelter,
sanitation,
and safety,"
petitioner merely asks whether double-celling, under all
the
circumstances,
allows
for
"adequate
shelter,
sanitation, and safety."
Petitioner's proposed standard
merely substitutes a different vague question for the
vague question that respondents ask:
whether doublecelling, under the totality of the circumstances, violates
concepts of "humanity and decency."
Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
Neither standard gives any
content to the phrase "cruel and unusual."
. ,·
I

,••

9.

constitutional violation itself, however, the Court merely
accepted the district court's conclusion "that, taken as a
whole,
the
Id.,

conditions

in the

isolation cells

prohibition against cruel and
at

687.

Other

cases

in

violate[d]

unusual punishments."

which

jail conditions

or

practices have been challenged under the Eighth Amendment
largely are inapposite.4

4 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), involved doublecelling, among other conditions, at an institution housing
unconvicted "detainees."
The question in that case was
whether double-celling constituted "punishment" prior to
conviction in violation of the Due Process Clause, not
whether it involved "cruel and unusual punishment" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The detainees in Bell
were double-celled for short periods of not more than 60
days. Furthermore, the detainees generally spent only 7-8
hours in their cells, and they presumably spent that time
sleeping.
The prisoners in the case now before the Court
are double-celled for considerably longer periods of time,
and they generally spend more hours per day confined to
their cells.
Thus, the holding in Bell that doublecelling
did
not
constitute
"punishment"
in
the
circumstances of that case does not foreclose a claim that
double-celling constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment"
in this case. But such a claim must be proven.
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the
question was whether a prisoner could claim under§ 1983
that inadequate medical care had violated his Eighth
Amendment
right.
The
Court
held
"that
deliberate
indifference
to
serious medical
needs
of
prisoners
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain, ' . . • proser ibed by the Eighth Amendment."
Id. , at
104.
The prisoner in that case proved that he had been
harmed.
Again, respondents here have not proved harm.

10.

In sum,
there
need

is no
not

prison

II

cruelty"

attempt
conditions

Amendment.

I believe that the Court can hold that

The

in this case,

to articulate a
can

be

"cruel

and

and

that

the Court

standard by which all

judged

under

unusual"

the

standard

extremely vague one; the Court need not consider

Eighth
is

an

in this

case whether it should remain vague.

Conclusion
I recommend reversing the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.

Thus, the petitioners cannot fairly be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to some harm.
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SUPIEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATIB

l . .. .

James A. Rhodes et al.,
Petitioners
. On Wnt of Cer-tiora.n to the Umted
'
States Court of Appeals for the
v.
Sixth Circuit.
K e11y Cl
, 1apman et a1.
[April -, 1981]
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the housing of two
inma,tes in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.

JI
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF'),
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action
in the District Court for the Southern :Oistrict of Ohio on
beha,lf of thems.elves and all inmates similarly situated at
SOCFo Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
they contended that "double celling'' at SOCF violated the
Eighth Amendment. The gravamen of their complaint was
that double celling confined cellmates too clpsely. It also
was blamed for ov/;'lrcrowding at SOCF, said to have over-whelmed the prison's facilities and staff.1 As relief, respond1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor double celling has
1
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's statewide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have
continued. Fllrthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's imly maximum-security
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons
has <:reated special p'roblems for the recipient prisous. Tr. of Oral Arg,

.,·',

t,
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ents sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio
officials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from
housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as · a temporary measure.
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the
court's own observations during an inspection that it condtJcted without advance notice. 434 },.- Supp. 1007 (1977).
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate population, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends
that these findings are erroneous.
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber
shop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field,
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class
facility." Id., at 1009.
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet.
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinettype night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent
near the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that
1nmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet,
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the
5--6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979).
2 ElOCF's library. contains 25,000 volumes, includ.i-ng law books, and was
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in
quality and quantity." 434 F Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court
described SOC:F''s clai;srooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at
1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify
them as a laundry, machine shop, i:;hoe factory, sheet metal shop, prin'i
sho~; sign l5hop, and en~ine-repair shop. See iii,) at 1010..
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cells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can
be seen.
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m.
According to the District Court, "[t]he day rooms are in a
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each
day room cont11ins a wall-mounted television, ca.rd tables,
and chairs. Inmates can ·pass between their cells and the
day rooms during a 10-minute period each hour, on the hour,
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened.
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that
SOCF began receiving inmates in late l 972 and double celling them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term
!entences for first-degree felonies. Approximately 1,400 inmates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits,
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent
more time looked in their cells because of a restrictive
classification.8
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed
'respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed
1 Inmates who requested protective custody but could not !Substantiate
their. fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their·
cells all but 6 hours a week Inmates cla::,sified as "voluntarily idle" and
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disciplinary· reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a. week to,
a,tten,d ret.tiow servicea, a movie,. or the cammisllll:ry..
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula..
tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade ..
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the
day rooms or visitation facilities, 4 nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the library or school rooms. 5 Although there were isolated incidents of failure to provide
medical or dent.al care, there was no evidence of indifference
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs. 0 As
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of violence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to
iumates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability offered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates
than jobs, had "waterr ed] down" jobs by assigning more inmates to each job than necessary and by reducing the number of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists
and social workers since double celling had begun.
4 The court noted that SOCF ib one of the few maximum tlecurity
pri:son:s m the country to permit contact visitation for all inmat~. 434
F. Supp, at 1014.
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to inmates in pro1ective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access
to court. A,, to school, no inmate who wai; "ready, able, and willing to
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was
som~ delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id., at

1015.
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial
backlog of inmate5 needing routine dental care, but the dental staff treated
·emergencies. Id ., at lOHi.
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the Dist.rict
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court rested its conclusion Oll five considerations. One,
inmates at SOCF are serving long terms of imprisonment.
In the court's view, this fact "can only accent[ uate] the
problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at
1020. Two, SOCF housed 38% more inmates at the time of
trial than its "design capacity." In reference to this the
court asserted, "Overcrowding necessa.rily involves excess
limitation of general movement as well as physical and mental injury from. long exposure." Ibid. Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of decency several studies
recommending that each person in an institution have at least
50-55 s,quare feet of living quarters.7 In contrast, double
celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square feet. Four, the
court asserted that "[a] t best a prisoner who is double celled
will spend most of his time in the cell with his cellmate." 8
Five, SOCF has made double celling a practice; it is not a
temporary condition.0
The Di::;trict Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn ., Manual
of Standard::; for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27
(1977) (60-80 square feet); National Sheriffs ' Assn., A Handbook oh Jail
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet) ; National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Pri::ioners,
§ 1 (50 square feet).
8 The court's as::iertion a::; to the amount of time that inmates spend
in their cells is not ::mpported by its findings. The court found that
75% of the double celled inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their
cells from 6:30 a . m. to 9:30 p . m . There is nothing in the findings to
suggest how many hour8 most inmate::; in fact spend in or out of their
cells.
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into ::;ingle
cells or release them, as respondent:; urged, the Di.;trict Court initially
ordered petitioners to "proceed with rea::;onable dispatch to formulate,
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each
of wlµch the court rejected. It thi,m orq.ered petitionerf> to reduce the
7

.

I
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed;
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opinion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were "permissible
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response
to the violations found.1°
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importanc~ of the question to prison administration. - U. S.
--. (1980). We now reverse.
II
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the
Eighth Amendment imposes upon the conditions in which
a State may confine those convicted of crimes. 11 It is unquestioned that "[c]onfinement in a prison . . . is a form
of punishment subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685
(1978); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977);
cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979). But until this
case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the
conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.12 Nor have we had an occainmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for
Cert., at A- 39.
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980).
11 The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robin.son v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962).
12 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison admiuistrat'lfrs 'dia 'not dispute the District Court'il conclusion that the conditions

'.
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sion to consider specifically the principles relevant to assess..
ing claims that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth
Amendment. We look, first, to the Eighth Amendment
precedents for the general principles that are relevant to a
State's authority to impose punishment for criminal conduct.
A

The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436
(1890) . Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia,
su'{Yra, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349
(1910). 13 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of
pain are those that are "totally without penological justificain two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the question was
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth Amendment does not
apply to rublic school disciplinary practices. In considering the differences between a prisoner and !L schoolchild, we stated, "Prison brutality ... is 'part of the total punislnnent to which the individual is being
subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth
Amendment scrutiuy.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976).
13 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can
be made criminal and punished as such. Robinson v. Califomia, 370
U. S. 660 (1992). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involved

. in this ,case,
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tion." Gr€g(J v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976).
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." 1'rop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957)
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that
"Eighth Amendment judgments sho:·ld neither be nor appear
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. R1:rnrnel v.
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [a covrt's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
597 (plura.Iity opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182'
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] should be informed by objective factors to tbe maximum extent possible. '" Rumrnel v. Estelle, supra,, at 275, quoting Coker v.
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example,
when the question was whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v.
Georgi,a, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgi,a, supra, at 593-596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the
common law and state legislatures, that "[a] n inmate must
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to do so. thoEe needs will not be met." 429
U . S., at 103.
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement
comporn the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they
b.e grossly disptopor.tio11ate to .t he severity of the crinil.e war-

h

,.
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ranty imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held
that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because,
in the worst case, it Cf:l,n result in physical torture, and, even
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any penological purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs.
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the
e~tent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh,
they ftre part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.

B
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its conclusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim.
The double celling made necessary by the increase in prison
· population did not lead to deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation. The closeness of the confinement did not increase violence among inmates or create other
. conditions intolerable for prison confinement. Although job
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a
result of qouble celling, limited work hours and delay before
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary
and wwton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amendment fro~ its language and history to hold that delay of
these desirable aids. to rehabilitation violates the Constitution.
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'fhe :five considerations on which the District Court rl:llied
also ard insufficient to support its consfitutional conclµsion.
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served
by inmates at SQC:f; the fact th~t SOC})' hol.lsed 38% more
inmates thap itis ·"design capacity"; the recommendation of
several ·studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 square
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double qelled in ..
mates spep.d most of their time in their c~Ils with their cellmateis; and the fact that double celling at SOC:F was not a
temporary conditio11. Supra, at - . These general considerntions 'fall 'fa.r short in themselves of proving cruel and
unusut1,l punishment, for there is no evidence that double
·celling under these circumstances either inflicts· unnecessary
or wJ1,nton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the :;;everity
of crimes warranting imprisonµient.u At most, these considerations amount to a theory that doubl~ celling inflicts
pain,1 G Perhaps they tefleot an aspiration toward an .ideal
14 R~pondents and the Distri'ct Court ~rred ip assuming tµat opinions
of e,~verts as fo desir,aple prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standar\is of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.,
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful a.nd relevant with respect
to some questions, but "they simpiy do · not establish the con.:ititutional
minima; rather, they establish goals recomn\ended by the orga11ization in
qu~tio~1." See Dept. of ju:st1ce, Federal $tandards for Prison:s and Jail~
1 (1980) . Indeed, geperalized opinions of eJperts c11nnot weigh as heavily
in determining contempon1ry ~tandards pf dec1mcy as ''the pubµc ~ttitude·
toward a give~ sanction!" Qregg v. Gwi-yta, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint
opinion) . There was no evidence in this case that double celling h,
viewed ~en~rally as 'violating decency. It Jtl ~pt unmr4al for many p~r.,
sons not confined in pri1:1ous, and not always coxnpelled by poverty, to
occupy sleeping qt1arterl:! that could be viewed a~ less favorable than those
at issue ip thi::i cal:!e.
15 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double cellipg for
long periods crnatei; a dangeromi potential for frU1:1tr11,tion, tension, and
violence. In respondents' view, it would be at) inf!ictlon of unnecessary
nd. wanton pu.in if double cellmg led to rioting. The danger of prison
riots i:s a ~erious concern, shared by the public as weU as by prison au~
tbn,it1es and, inmattiso. l3ut . resl?ondents' co'!.l.tention doeti not lea~ m dre:
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~nvironment for long-term confinement. But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of
SOCF's ty17e, wtiich house persons convicted of serious
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations prope~ly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration ratl1er than a court. There being no constitutional violation, the District Court had no authority to consider whether 'double celling in light of these considerations
was the best response ' to the increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population,

III
Courts must proceed cautiously in making Eighth Amendment judgments because "[a] decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot
be reversed short Qf a constitutional amendment," and thus
" [r] evisions cannot be made in the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176. In assessing
claims that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual,
courts must bear in mind that their inquiries "spring from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them
must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best
to operate a detention facility." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.,

at 539.

16

conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual. The District Court's findings of fact lend no support to this claim. Moreover, a
pri,mn's internal security is peculia.rly a matter normHlly left to the discretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, s'Upra, at 551, and
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum, 4a3 U. S. 119,
132-133 (1977) ; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 827 (1974).
16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of pri:;on
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974).
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisom; and Jails,
5 vols. (1980) . It suffices here to repeat that
"The problemi, of prii,ons in America are complex and intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily sw;ceptible of resolt.Jtion by decree.
l\1ost 1·eqtiire expertise, comprehensive plruming, and the commitment ;of

'·
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Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons,
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplorable" and "sordid." Bell v. WoZ.fish, 441 U. S., at 562. When
c.onditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment,
"federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." Prpcunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 405406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) (per
curwm). In discharging this oversight responsibility, however, courts cannot assume that stat~ legislatures and prison
officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment or to the perplexing sociological problems of how
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens.

.,

,.,1..,:

•·.

.

'.
....

'•

resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons,
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform . Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405.
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 568 (1974); Junes v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977).
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and
administration have been exacerbated by the increa::,;e of serious crime
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities.
This ca;;e is illustrative. Ohio t!esigned and built SOCF in the early
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be :~ modern "topflight, first-class facility/' Supra, at - . Yet, au unanticipated increa:,;e
in the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at
issue. According to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three
factors influence prison population: the level of arrests, prosecution policies, and sentencing and parole deci~ion::1. Because these factors can
change rapidly, while prisons require years to plan and build1 it is extremely difficult to calibrate a prison's "design capacity" with predictions of prison population. Memorandum of the United. States as Amicus.:
'C,~riae ,31 6•.
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In this case, the question before us is whether the conditions of confinr,ment at SOCF are crueland um.isual. As we
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.
It is so ordered.
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Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Sincerely,/
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Justice Powell
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Dear Lewis,
Assuming your willingness to make the verbal changes we disccused on the telephone, I am
glad to join your opinion for the Court.
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Sincerely yours,
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Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 23, 1981

Re:

80-332 - Rhodes v. Chapman

Dear Lewis:
It seems to me that there may be a danger in
relying on the absence of evidence of rioting to
support the conclusion that confinement of two
persons in a small cell is not cruel and unusual
punishment.
It is at least theoretically possible
that prisoners in a truly barbarous concentration
camp might be too intimidated to riot. Moreover,
I would hesitate to send out a signal to a community
of prison litigants that a few good riots would
improve their litigation posture.
In all events,
I shall wait to see what Bill Brennan writes before
coming to rest.
Respectfully,

J,l

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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DEANG-POW
April 23, 1981

RE:

80-0332 Rhodes v. Chapman

Dear John:

~ n..,-'..,.Je. ~h' ~~ ;z;.,, .
<{/ The reference to respondents argument that double
'•' • .

celling creates a dangerous potential for violence is

eJ

addres x only in Note 14, p. 10.

Your letter, as I understand it, makes two points.
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First) that it is theoretically possibly in a truly
"barbarous concentration camp" to intimidate inmates to the
poin t where t hey would not riot.

If we had such a

concentration camp before us, it wou~
reasons violate the eighth amendmen

s and other

l

Your second point is that we should "hesitate to send
out a signal" to prison inmates that a few riots would
improve their chances to litigate successfully.

I was
,,

addre~

.

nly the facts of this case, in which there is no

evidence at all of violence

thereof
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Would it be helpful to your concerns if I changed the
fourth and fifth sentences in the footnote to read as
follows:

J

-to. the conclusion

"but respondents contention does not
lead

that double celling at

SOCF is cruel and unusual, whatever may be
the situation in a different case.
District Court Is findings of fact

The ~

es.Ciie.
lend
.... _-

no support to respondents claim in this
case."

I assume that you are not suggesting that~ e-ea1:1ae- of'¥
~

the possibility of rioting ( t ~ I suppose exists at every
prison) justifies a~! .E!:. rule against doubling celling.

Sincerely,

.:iltp'rtUtt <!]:iturl itf t!rt ~th ;itaft.&'

~frin:ghtn.~.<!]:. 20ffe~,
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 23, 1981

Re:

80-332 - Rhodes v. Chapman

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

Re:

April 23, 1981

Rhodes v. Chapman, No. 80-332

Dear Lewis:
Although I agree with your conclusion that the District Court
was in error in this case, I am concerned that your opinion might
be viewed as discouraging other District Courts from conducting the
rigorous examination of prison conditions that I believe the Eighth
Amendment requires. I think I can best reveal my concerns by writing
separately, and will do so in due course.

Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the housing of two
inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional {
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
JusTICE POWELL

I
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF),
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the /
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed
the prison's facilities and staff. 1 As relief, respondents
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's statewide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons
has created special problems for the recipient prisons. Tr. of Oral Ar~.
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sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio offi-:
cials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary
measure.
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the
court's own observations during an inspection that it conducted without advance notice. 434 )?. Supp. 1007 (1977),
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate population, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends
that these findings are erroneous.
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber
shop, and library. 2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field,
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class
facility." Id., at 1009.
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet.
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinettype night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent
near the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet,
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the
5-6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979).
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and was
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in
quality and quantity." 434 F . Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court
described SOCF's classroom::; as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at
1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify
them as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print
shop; sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010.
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cells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can
be seen.
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks
and are open to inmates between 6:30 a. m. and 9:30 p. m.
According to the District Court, " [t] he day rooms are in a
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables,
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the
day rooms during a IO-minute period each hour, on the hour,
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened.
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double celling them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term
sentences for first-degree felonies. Approximately 1,400 inmates were double celled. Of these, about 75 % had the
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits,
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmatee spent
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive
classification. s
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food
was "adequate ih every respect," and respondents adduced
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed
8 Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate
their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disciplinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week
'attend religious services, a movie, or the commissar.y.
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula~
tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade~
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the
day rooms or visitation facilities,4 nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the library or school rooms. 5 Although there were isolated incidents of failure to provide
medical or denta.I care, there was no evidence of indifference
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs. 6 As
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of violence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability offered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates
than jobs, had "water[ed] down" jobs by assigning more inmates to each job than necessary and by reducing the number of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists
and social workers since double celling had begun.

'·

e,·

'.

The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434
F. Supp., at 1014.
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to inmates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was
somo delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id., at
1015.
6
Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial
backlog of inmates needing routine dental care, hut the dental staff treated
emergencies. Id ., at 1016.
4
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and
unusual punishment. The court, rested its conclusion on five
,considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more in•
mates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding necessarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well
a~ physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid.
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of decency several studies recommending that each person in an
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters. 7
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac·
tice; it is not a temporary condition. 0
7
The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27
(1977) (60-80 square feet); National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jail
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners,
§ 1 (50 square feet).
8 The court's assertion as to the amount of time that inmates spend
in their cells is not supported by its findings. The court found that
75% of the double celled inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their
cells from 6:30 a. m. to 9:30 p. m. There is nothing in the findings to
suggest how many hours most inmates in fact spend in or out of theircells.
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate,
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at
SOCF." 434 F. Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each
,o_f which the court rej_ected.. It then ordered petitioners to i:educe the·
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed;
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opinion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were "permissible
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response
to the violations found.10
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question to prison administration.. U. S.
(1980). We now reverse.

II
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v. Californ-ia, 370 U. S.
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State
may confine those convicted of crimes. It is unquestioned
that "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards."
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 ( 1977) ; cf. Bell v. W ol,fish, 441
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.11 Nor have we had an occasion to consider speinmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for
Cert., at A-39.
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980).
11 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison administrators -did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the conditions
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cifically the principles relevant to assessing claims that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the general principles that are relevant to a State's authority to irn ..
pose punishment for criminal conduct.
A
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436
(1890). Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia,
supra, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910). 12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of
pain are those that are "totally without penological justificain two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison
brutality ... is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976).
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can
be made criminal and punished as such. Robinson v. California, 370
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involvefi
in this 'case.

l
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tion." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976).
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957)
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that
"Eighth Amendment judgments shodd neither be nor appear
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. R1,mmel v.
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [a corrt's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment.[s] should be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible.' " Rummel v. Estelle, supra,, at 275, quoting Coker v.
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example,
when the question was whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that delib·
erate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the
common law and sta.t e legisla.tures, that "[a]n inmate must
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to do so, thoEe needs will not be met." 429
U. S., at 103.
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement
compoEe the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime war-
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-rantf imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held
-that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because,
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any penological purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic hl'ma.n needs.
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh,
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.

B
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its conclusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one
of- the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim.
The double celling made necessary by the increase in prison
population did not lead to deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation. The closeness of the confinement did not increase violence among inmates or create other
conditions intolerable for prison confinement. Although job
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not
punishments. We would have to wrern•h the Eighth Amendment from its language and history to hold that delay of
these <lesirable aids to -rehabilitation violates the Constitution•

•
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion.
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 square
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled inmates spend most of their time in their cells with their cellmates; and the fact that double celling at SOCF was not a
temporary condition. Supra, at - . These general considerations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unneceSEary
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of crimes warranting imprisonment. 13 At most, these considerations amount to a theory that double celling inflicts
pain. 14 Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an ideal
13 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions
of experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.,
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in
que,,;tion." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails
1 (1980). Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude
toward a given sanction." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint
opinion) . There was no evidence in this case that double celling is
viewed generally as violating decency. It is not unusual for many persons not confined in prisons, and not always compelled by poverty, to
occupy sleeping quarters that could be viewed as less favorable than those
at issue in this case.
14
Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and
violence. In resJJondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary
and wanton pain if double celling led to rioting. The darger of prison
riots is a serious concern, shared by the public as well as by prison authorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to the
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,environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitu.,tion does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court. There being no constitutional violation, the District Court had no authority to consider whether double celling in light of these considerations
was the best response to the increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population.

III
Courts must proceed cautiously in making Eighth Amendment judgments because "[a] decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot
be reversed short of a constitutional amendment," and thus
"[r]evisions cannot be made in the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176. In assessing
claims that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual,
courts must bear in mind that their inquiries "spring from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them
must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how beet
to operate a detention facility." Bell v, Wolfish, 441 U. S. 1
at 539.15
conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual. The District Court's findings of fact lend no support to this claim. Moreover, a
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 551, and
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum, 433 U. S. 119,
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 827 (1974).
15 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison
administration. Procunie1· v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974).
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails,
5 vols. ( 1980). It suffices here to repeat:
"[T] he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and,
morq to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
M~t ·r,eq_uire expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commit~ent ill°
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Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons,
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplorable" and "sordid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562. When
conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect
constitutional rights." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396,
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972)
(per cur'i am). In discharging this oversight responsibility,
however, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens.

l
l

'•

resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons,
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id,, at 405 (footnote
omitted).
See also Wolff v, McDonnell, 418 U. S, 539, 561-562, 568 (1974): Jones v.
No rth Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union , 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977).
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities.
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "topflight, first-class facility." Supra, at 2, Yet, an unanticipated increase
in the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at
issue. According to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three
factor8 influence prison population: the number of arrests, prosecution poli-·
cies, and sentencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can
change rapidly, while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to calibrate a prison's "design capacity" with predictions of prison population. Memorandum of the United States as ,Amicus
Cttri'ae :3, 6,

,_
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In this case, the question before us is whether the conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
io reversed.

It is so ordered.

....

'·

.·

April 24, 1981
RE:

r

80-0332 Rhodes v. Chapman

John:
Thank you for your
The reference to respondents argument that double celling creates a dangerous potential for violence is addressed
only in Note 14, p. 10.
Your letter, as I understand it, makes two points.
First, that it is theoretically possibly in a truly •barbarous concentration camp" to intimidate inmates to the point
where they would not riot. If we had such a concentration
camp before us, it would of course violate the eighth amendment for this and other reasons.
Your second point is that we should •hesitate to send
out a signal• to prison inmates that a few riots would improve their chances to litigate successfully. I was addressing only the facts of this case, in which there is no
evidence of violence reaching riot proportions.
would it be helpful to your concerns if I changed the
fourth and fifth sentences in the footnote to read as
follows:
•aut respondents contention does not lead to
the conclusion that double celling at SOCF is
cruel and unusual, whatever may be the situation in a different case. The District
Court's findings of fact lend no support to
respondents claim in this case."
I assume that you are not suggesting that the
possibility of rioting (which I suppose exists at every
prison), justifies a per se rule against doubling celling.

Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

I
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 28, 1981

Re:

No. 80-332,

Rhodes v. Chapman

Dear Lewis,
This will confirm that I join your opinion
for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFB
,,,

I . .. .
No. SQ,..332

James A. Rhodes et al.,
Petitioners
On Wnt of Certiorari to the Umted
'
States Court of Appeals for the
v.
Sixth Circuit.
K e11y Ch apman et a1.
[April -, 1981]
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the housing of two
inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

I
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF),
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed
the prison's facilities and stafl'.1 As relief, respondents
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's statewide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons
has created special problems for the recipient prisons. Tr. of Oral Arg.

,.

.
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gought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio offi..
oials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary
measure.
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the
court's own observations during an inspection that it conducted without advance notice. 434 }~. Supp. 1007 (1977).
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate population, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends
that these findings are erroneous.
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. · In addition to 1620
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary; barber
shop, and library. 2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field ,
visitation area, and garden. · The District Court described
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight; first:..class
facility ." Id., at 1009.
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet.
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinettype night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent
near the ceiling, and 960 of the ce1ls have a window that
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet,
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the
5-6. Thus, petitioners have au interest in resuming double celling at
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979) .
2

SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and was
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in
quality and quantity." 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977) . The court
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at
1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify
them as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print
shop, sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010.
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ce-Jls one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can
be seen.
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m.
According to the District Court, "[t]he day rooms are in a
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables,
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the
day rooms during a 10-minute period each hour, on the hour,
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened.
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double celling them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term
sentences for first-degree felonies. Approximately l,400 inmates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits,
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive
classification. 8
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed

...

~

·-

'.

8 Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate
their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and
newly arrived inmates awaiting · classification had only 4 hours a week
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disciplinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week to
attend religious services, a movie, or the commissary,

...

'
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula-,
tion." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was ade.,
quate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the
day rooms or visitation facilities,4 nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the library or school rooms.~ Although there were isolated incidents of failure to provide
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs. 6 As
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of violence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability offered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates
than jobs, had "water[ ed] down" jobs by assigning more inmates to each job than necessary and by reducing the number of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists
and social workers since double celling had begun.
' The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434
F. Supp., at 1014.
n The court found that adequate law books were available, even to inmates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was
some delay before an mmate received the opportunity to attend. Id ., at
1015.
6
,
Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial
backlog of inmates needin~ routine dental care, but the dental staff treated
emergencies. Id., at 10m.

..
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only
accent[ uate] the problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more inmates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding necessarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well
as physical a.nd mental injury from long exposure." Ibid.
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of decency several studies recommending that each person in an
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters.7
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a practice; it is not a temporary condition. 9
7 The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27
(1977) (60-80 square feet); National Sheriffs' Assn ., A Handbook on Jail
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners,
§ 1 (50 square feet) .
'
8 The basis of the District Court's assertion as to the amount of time
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the court's opinion.
Elsewhere in it;; opinion, the court found that 75% of the double celled
inmates at SOCF are free; to. be out of their cell:s from 6~30 a. m. to
9 p. m. 434 F. Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated that it made this
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate clai;sification, which
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012.
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate,
propose, and carry out sotjle plan which will terminate double celling at
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each
' of which the court rejected. It then ordered petitioners to reduce the
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed;
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opinion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were "permissible
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response
to the violations found. 10 ·
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the imp6rtance of the question to prison administration. U. S.
(1980). We now reverse.
II
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S.
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State
may confine those convicted of crimes. It is unquestioned
that "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards."
llutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 11 Nor have we had an occasion to consider speinmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for
Cert., at A-39.
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F . 2d 1099 (1980).
11 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison administrators did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the conuitions

,
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eifically the principles relevant to assessing claims that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We
iook, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the general principles that are relevant to a State'~ a.uthority to im~
pose punishment for criminal conduct.

A
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436
(1890). Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the
unnecessa.ry and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia,
su'{J1'a, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349
(1910). 12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of
pain are those that are "totally without penological justificain two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison
brutality ... is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976).
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can
be made criminal and punished as such. Robinson v. Ca/,ifornia, 370
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not invaived
ln this case.

.
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tion." GrEgg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 u. s. 97, 103 (1976).
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." · Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957)
(plurality opinion). · The Court has held, however, that
"Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). · To be sure, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [a court's] own judgment will be brought t6 bear on the question of the acceptability" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgi,a, supra, at 182
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] · should be . informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible.' " Rummel v. Estelle, supra, at ·275, quoting C-oker v.
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example,
when the question was whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated contemporary va1ues, the Court looked
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, at -176-187; Coker v. Georgw, supra, at 593596. Our conclusion iri Estelle v. Gamole, supra, that.. deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the
common law and state legislatures, that "[a]n inmate must
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to · ao so, those needs Vi;ill not be met." 429
U. S., at 103.
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement
comporn the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve·
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can ·they
. be grossly disprop·ottiomi.re to the severity of·th:e crim-e WaT-

•'
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ranting imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held
tlrnt the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because,
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any penological purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic ht:man needs.
'Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel
and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency
'that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under
contemporary standards a.re not unconstitutional. To the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh,
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay .for
their offenses against society.

B
In view of the District Court's findings of, fact, its conclusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim.
The double celling made necessary by the increase in prison
population did not lead to deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violence
among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for
prison confinement. 434 F. Supp., at 1018. Although · job
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a
result of double celling, limited work hours and ·delay before
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amendment from its language and history to hold that delay 01
, these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the' Constitu'tio"f1.

..
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion.
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 square
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double 'celled inmates spend most of their time in their cells with their cellmates; and the fact that · double ce1ling at SOCF was not a
temporary condition. Supra, at - . · These general considerations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unnecesrnry
or wanton pain or· is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of crimes wa.rranting imprisonment. 18 At most, these considerations amount to a theory that double ce1ling inflicts
pain. 14 Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an ideal
13

Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions

vf experts as to drsirable prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.,
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional'
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails
1 (1980). Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude
toward a given sanction." Gregg v. Georgfo, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint
opinion). There was no evid.ence in this case that d·ouble celling is
viewed generally as violating decency. The cells are smaller than may bs
ideal, but they are exceptionally functional and modern: they are hrnted,
ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and a sanitary toilet . Each
cell also has a radio. 434 F. Supp., at 1011. Many parsons not confined
in prisons, and not always compelled by poverty, would welcome comparable sleeping quarters.
1'l Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and ·
violence. In respondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary
~'0-d·. wanton pain if dollble celling led to rioting: The da.r.ger of prison·

l
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court. There being no constitutional violation, 15 the District Court had no authority to conriots is a serious concern, shared by the public as well as by prison authorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to the
conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual. The District Court's findings of fact lend no support to this claim. Moreover, a
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discrPtion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra. at 551, and
11. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum, 433 U. S. 119,
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. S17, 827 (1974).
15 The dissenting opinion states that "the facility described by [the
Court] is not the one involved in this case." Post, at - . The incorrectness of this statement is apparent from a comparison of the facts set
forth at length above, see ante, 2-4, and nn . 2-6, with the District Court's
detailed findings of fact. See 434 F. Supp., at 1009-1018.
In several instances, the dissent selectively relies on testimony without
nrknowledging that the District Court gave it little or no weight. For
rxample, the dissent emphasizes the tes•imony of experts as to rsychologi0al prrb1ams that "may be expected" from double celling; it also
relies on similar testimony as to an increase in tension and .<t@:gression.
Id., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and
physirian that "there has been no increase [in violence l other than what
one would expect from increased numbers [of inrnatesl" Id., at 1018.
More telling is the fact-ignored by the dissent-that the District Court
resolved this conflict in the testimony by holding "that there had been
no increase in violence or criminal activity increase due to double celling;
there has been [an increase] due to increased population." Ibid. This
holding was based on uncontroverted prison records, required to be
maintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and desrribed by the
District Court as being "detail[ed] and bespeak[ing] credibility." Ibid.
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court concrrning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required to
rt•main in their cells. The dissent, post, at - , n. 6, relies only on

.
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sider whether double celling in light of these considerations
was the best response to the increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population.

.(

·,

III
Courts must proceed cautiously in making Eighth Amendment judgments because "[a] decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot
be reversed short of a constitutional amendment," and thus
" [ r l evisions cannot be made in the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at176. In assessing
claims that conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual,
courts must bear in mind that their inquiries "spring from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them
sclPctive finding:; that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours
earh day, and tlrnt others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp.,
at 1018. The dissent fails to note that the fir:;t of the:;e findings ii; flatly
inconsistent with a prior, twice-repeated, finding by the Court that inmatrs "have to be locked in their crll with their cellmate only from
around 9 :00 p. 111. to 6: 30 a. 111.," id., at 1013, 1012, leaving them free to
move about for some 14 hours. Moreover, it i:; unquestioned-and also
l!Ot mrntioned by the diosent-that the inmates who spend mm,t of their
1unC' locked in their cells are thosr who have a "restrictive classification."
Tlw:;r include inmate:; found guilty of "rulr infractions [after] a plenary
beHring" nnd inmates who "are there by 'choice' at lem,t to some degree."
Ibid. It mw,t be rnnmebered that SOCF is a maximum-security prison,
liousing only persons guilty of violent and other ;,erious crimes. It is
e~H(;'ntial to maintain a regime of close rnpervi8ion and discipline.
The dissent also makes much of the fact that SOCF wa;, housing 38%
more inmates at the time of trial than iti, "rated capacity." According
to the United States Bureau of PrisonH, at least three factors influence
pri~on population: the n11mber of arrests, prosecution policies, and senlenring and parole decisions. Because these factorti can changP rapidly,
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to
enlibrate a pri:;on's "rated" or "design capacity" with predictions of
pri,ou population . Memorandum of the United States as Arnicus Curiae
;3, 6. The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF
l!;lle~i,ed incorrectly about future priHon population, but whether the actnaI
t'onditious of confinement at SOCF are cruel and mrnsual.
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must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best
to operate a detention facility." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.,
at 539. 16
Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons,
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplorable" and "sordid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562. When
conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect
constitutional rights." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396,
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972)
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility,
however, courts cannot assume tha.t state legislat11res and
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how
rn We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prii;on
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974).
Sec generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails,
5 vols. (1980). It suffices here to repeat:
"[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex a.nd intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons,
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform . Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405 (footnote
omitted).
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977).
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities.
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "topflight, first-class facility." Supra, at 2. Yet, an unanticipated increase
_in .the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is /;\t
)S6Ue, .
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best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
chance of being usefuJ, law-abiding citizens.
In this case, the question b.efore .us is whether the conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.
It is -ordered.
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Dear
I have done the "scrubbing" with respect to one
the points you mentioned, and will recirculate.
1
·

As to Trop v. Dulles, I do not feel justified in
making a change. I had a clerk run T op down on Lexis. It
has been cited in at least 303 federa cases, and the
precise phrase "evolving standards of decency" has been 'ffl; ·,
quoted in 156 of these cases. The last opinions for the
Court to quote the phrase are Ingraham v. Wright and Estelle
v. Gamble, cases that I believe oth you and I joined.
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If we can pick up one more vote in Rhodes, 91v1ng
us a 6-3 majority, I think my decision will help settle the
law with respect to the "prison conditions" cases.
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pleasing but extravagant rhetoric which has too
much "rubber" in it to suit my taste and is
reminiscent of the late unlamented (nonsense)
language of Roth about "redeeming social
importance".-This game of rhetoric -- to which we are all
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trouble. For my part, I am always receptive to
the use of the "Vanderbilt blue pencil."
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[April - , 1981]
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the housing of two
inmates in a, single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
JusTICE POWELL

- I
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOOF),
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. - They
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. ·§ 1983,
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was · that
double celling confined cellmates too closely. · It also was
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed
the prison's facilities and staff.1 As relief, respondents
1

As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's statewide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, havecontinued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons·
: bas ' c,eated special problems for the recipient prisons. Tr. of Oral Arg,.
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sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio ofl},
cials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary
measure,
The District Court ma1e extensive findings of fact about
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the
court's own observations during an inspection that it conducted without advance notice. 434 }~. Supp. 1007 (1917).
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate population, and effects of double c·elling, Neither party contends
that these findings are erroneous.
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. · In addition to 1620
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissa.ry, · barber
shop, and library.2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field,
visitation area, and garden. · The District Court described
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class
facility." Id., at 1009.
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet.
Each contains a bed measuring -36 by ·so inches, a cabinettype night stand, a wall-mounted siiik with hot and cold
running water, and a to'ilet that the inmate can flush from
· inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered
bunk bed. Every cell ha.s a· heating arid air circulation vent
near the ceiling, and 960 of the ce1ls have a window that
· inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet,
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the

'•

',

· 5-6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at
SOCF. See Bell v. Wol/ts'h, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979),
2
SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and wa~
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," arid "superior in
quality and quantity!' 434 F . Supp. 1007, · 1010 (1977) . · The court
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." . Id., at
1015. The court did not · describe SOCF's workshops except to identify
them as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print·
shop, s1g11 shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010.
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'eells one wall consists of bars through which the inm~tes can
be seen.
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks
and are open to inmates between 6:30 a. m. and 9:30 p. m.
According to the District Court, " [ t] he day rooms are in a
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen
would seek in his living room or den." 1d., at 1012. Each
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables,
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the
day rooms during a 10-minute period each hour, on the hour,
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened,
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double celling them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term
sentences for first~degree felonies. Approximately 1,400 inmates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits,
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive
classification.3
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food
was "adequate in every respect/' and respondents adduced
ho evidence uwhatsoever that prisoners have been underfed
s Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate
'their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" anil
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disci~
plinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week ttt
·,attend religious services, a movie, or the commissary.
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison popula,.
'tion ." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was adequate, the cells were· substa;ntially free of offensive odor, the
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the
day rooms or visitation facilities,• nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the libra.r y or school rooms. 5 Although the_re were isolated inci'dents of failure to provide
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference
by the SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs. 6 As
to violence, the court found tha.t the number of acts of violence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but
only in proportion to · the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce evidence establishing that · double celling itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to
"inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability offered by responclents' expert witness. Finally, the court did
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates
· than jobs, had "water[edl down" jobs by assigning more inmates to each job than necessary arid by re·ducing the number of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it also
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists
' and social workers since "double celling had begun.
The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. · 434
F . Supp., at 1014.
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to inmates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access
to court. As to school. no inmate who was "ready, ·able, and willing to
receive schooling has been . denied the opportunity",'' although there waS'
some delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend . · Id., at
. 1015.
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial
· backlog of inmates needing routine: dental care, but the: dental staff treated'.
' ·emergencies. Id., at 1016.
4
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more inmates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding necessarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well
as physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid.
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standa.rds of decency several studies recommending that each person in an
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters;1
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac~
tice; it is not a temporary condition. 0
7 The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual
·of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27
(1977) (60-80 square feet) ; National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jail
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners,
§1 (50 square feet) .
8 The basis of the District Court's assertion as to the amount of time
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the court's opinion.
Elsewhere in its opinion, the court found that ·75% of the double celled
inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their cells from 6:30 a. m. to
9 p. m. 434 F . Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated that it made thil!
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate classification, which
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012.
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate,
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each
·of wnich the court rejected. It then ordered petitioners to reduce tht,
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling
is per se unconstitutional. · The Court of Appeals -disagreed;
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holdipg only that
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the
circumstances at SOCF. ·- It affirmed, without further o,pinion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were
not clearly erroneous, its con·clusions of law were "permissible
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response
to the violn,tions found.10
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question to prison administration. - U, S,
(1980). We now reverse,

.,

II
We consider here for the first ·time the limitation that ·tp.e
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, Rob-inson v. California, 370 U. S.
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State·
may confine those convicted of crimes. · It is unquestioned
that ''[c]onµnement in a prison ... is a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards."
Hutto v. Finney , 437 U. S.-678, 685 (f978); see Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); c[ Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the conditions of confinement at a. particular prison constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.11 Nor have we had an ·occasion to consider spe-i n~ate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population: fell
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700; App. to Pet. for
Cert., at A-39.
10 The Court of Appeals ' stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F . 2d 1099 (1980).
11 In _Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison: administl'atois "c\id 'not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the condition~
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£ificaUy the principles relevant to assessing claims that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the general principles that are relevant to a State's authority to im..
pose punishment for criminal conduct.
A

The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the
tionstitutiqnal limitation upon punishments: they cannot be
"cruel and unusual." ·The Court has interpreted these words
uin a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion) , and has extended the
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkersot1,
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 4M
(1890) . Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia,
supra, at :173, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. K 584, 5-92 (1977)
(plurality opinion) ; Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 34!)
(1910) .1 2 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of
pain are those that are "totally without penological justifica-

..

in two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) , the question was
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cruel anci'
unusual punishment. We held t hat the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering
t he differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison
brutality . . . is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.' " Id ., at 669, quoting 1ngraham v. Wright, 525
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976).
.
.
12 The Eight h Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can
be made criminal and punished as such. Rooinson v. California, 37&
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involved"
in t his case,
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tion." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 u. s. 97, 103 (1976) .
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine
. whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." "Trap V. Dulles, 356 u. S. 86, 101 (1957)
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that
"Eighth Amendment judgments shorld neither be nor appear
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980) . To be sure, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [a corrt's] own judg, ment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] shou1d be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible.'" Rummel v. Estelle, supra,, at 275, quoting Coker v.
'Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For examp1e,
when the question was whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated contemporary va1ues, the Court lo0ked
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, a,.t 593596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that delib·erate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the
·common hw and state legislatures, that "r a] n inmate must
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." 429'
U. S., at 103.
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement
·comporn the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they
be grossly disproportionate to the severity 1of the crime wm-~
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ranting imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we held•
that the denial of medical care is cruel and unl!sual because,
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any penological purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons const:tuted
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivat:ons of basic hrman needs.
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or
in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions col'ld be cruel·
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the
extent that such conditions are restrictive a.nd even harsh,
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.

B
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its conclusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim.
rrhe double celling made necessary by the increase in prison
population did not lead to deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase violenoe
among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for,
prison confinement. 434 F . Supp., at 1018. Although job
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary
and wanton pain ; deprivations of this kind simply are not
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amendment from its language and history to hold that delay ofijlese <t.esil,'(tbl~ aigs to :t_'eh~bilit~tiqn viol~t~ the Constitution._
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion.
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served
by inmates at SOCF·; the fact that SOCF housed 38% more
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 equare
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled inmates spend most of their time in their cells with their cellmates; and the fact that double celling at SOCF was not a
temporary condition. Supra, at - . These general considerations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unnecesrnry
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of crimes warranting imprisonment. 18 At most, these coneiderations amount to a theory that double celling inflicts
pain.u Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an ideal
18 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions
cf experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.,
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails
l (1980) . Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude
toward a given sanction." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint
opinion) . There was no evidence in this case that double celling is
viewed generally as violating decency. The cells are smaller than may be
ideal, but they are exceptionally functional and modern: they are h~ated,
ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and a sanitary toilet. Each
cell also has a radio . 434 F . Supp., at 1011. Many p"rs0ns not confined
in prisons, and not always compelled by poverty, would welcome comparable sleeping quarters.
14 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and
violence. In respondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary
and wanton pain if double celling led to rioting. The dar.ger of prison
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court. There being no constitu~
tional violation,1° the District Court had no authority to con..
riots is a serious concern, shared by the public as well as by prison authorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to th~
conclusirn that double celling at SOCF is cntel and unusual, whatever
may be the situaticn in a different case. The District Court's finding::;
of fact lend no support to respondents' claim in this case. Moreover, it
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish. supra. at. 551, and
n. 32: Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners1 Labor "Union. 433 U. S. 119,
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. SI17, 827 (1974).
15 The dissenting opinion states t1iat "the facility described by [the
Court l is not the one involved 1n tbis case.'' Post, at - . The incorrectness of this statement is apparent from an examination of the facts set
forth at lenf.{th above, see ante, 2-4, and rm . 2--G, and the District Court's
detailed findings of fact. See 434 F . Supp., at 1009-1018.
In several instances, the dissent selectively reli ,s on testimony without
arknowledging that the District Court gave it jittle or no weight. For
example. the dissent emphasizes the tes·imony of exn°rts as to rsychologiral problems that "may be exp3cted" frcm double celling; it also
relies on similar testimony as to an increase in tension and !ip.:p.:ression.
l d., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and
physician that "there has been no increase rin violence l other than what
one would expect from increased numbers [of inmatesl" ld .. at 1018.
More telli"g is the fact-ignored by the dissevt-that the District Court
resolved this co!1:fld in the testimony by holding " that there had been
no incrers"" in Yiolenre or criminal artivity increase due to double crllintt;
there has been ra.n increasel due to increased population." Ibid. This
ho!di- g was b:tsed on uncontroverted prison records , required to be
m'lintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and des~ribed bv the
Di~tri~t Court as being "detail[edl and b~speakrin!!J credibility." Ibid .
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court roncerning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required t<l
r emain in fheir cells. The dissent, . post, at - , n . 6, relies only rO~
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sider whether double celling in light of these considerations
was the best response to the increase in ·Ohio':3 state-wide
prison population.

III
This court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth
Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, "[a] decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment," anti thus "[r]evisions cannot be made in
the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S.,
at 176. In assessing claims that conditions of confinement
are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their
inquiries "spring from constitutional requirements and that
selective findings that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours
each day, and that others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp.,
at 1013. The dissent fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly
inconsistent wit):i a prior, twice-repeated, - finding· by the Court that inmates "have to be locked in .their cell with their cellmate only from
around 9 :00 p . m. to 6:30 a. m.," '.id., at 1013," 1012, leaving them free to
move about for some 14 hottrs. Moreover, it is unquestioned-and also
not mentioned by the diEsent- that the inmates who spend most of their
time Jocked in their cells are those who have a "restrictive classification:''
These include inmates found guilty of "rule infractions [ after J a plenary
henring" and inmates who "are there by 'choice' at least to some degree;''
lb-id. It must be remembered tbat SOCF is a maximum-security prison,
housing only persons guilty of violent and other serious crimes. It is
essential to maintain a regime of close supervision and discipline.
The dissent also makes mt1ch of the fact that SOCF was housing 38%
tnore inmates at the time of tr1al tha11 its "rated capacity." According
to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three factors influence
priso~ pop{tlation : · the number of arrests, prosecution policies, mid sentencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can change rapidly,
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to
calibrate a priso1i's " rated " or "design capacity" with predictions of
prlson population. Memorandum of the United States as Arnicus Curiae
3, 6. The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF
guessed incorrec_tly ·about future prison population, but whether· the actua!
· conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual.
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judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a
court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Bell
v. Wol-fi,sh, 441 U. S., at 539. 16
Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons,
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deplorable" and "sordid." Bell v. WoZ:fish, 441 U. S., at 562. When
conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect
constitutional rights." Procun1:er v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396,
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. E~-to, 405 U. S. 319, 3-21 (1972)
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility,
however, courts cannot assume that state legislakres and
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how

,.

..
'

16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974).
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails,
5 vols. (1980) . It suffices here to repeat:
"[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, arid,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and "the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within ·the pro·vince of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of ·those reasons,
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems o1
prison administration and reform . ·· Judicial recognition of ·that · fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405 (footnote
omitted) .
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S; 119, 125 (1977).
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population ani!
administration have been exacerbated by · the increase of serious crime
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities.
This case is· illustrative. Ohio · designed and built SOCF in · the early
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "top'flight , first-class facility." Supra, af 2. - -Yet, an unanticipated increa~
in the State's pri~on population compelled the do'Qble celling that is :at
issue,
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best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the cvimin~l
justice system : to punish justly, to geter future crime, and
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
chance of being useful, law~abiding citizens.
In this case, the question before us is· wpether the conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we
find that they are not, the judgment· of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.
l

tt

is sa ordered.
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The question presented is whether the housing of two
inmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

I
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF),
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. They
were housed in the same cell when they brought this action
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed
the prison's facilities and staff.1 As relief, respondents:
1

Marshall'
Blaokmun
Rohnquist
Stevana

As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor,· double celling has
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's statewide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisons:
has created special problems for the recipient prjsons. Tr. of Oral Arg•.
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sought an injunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio officials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary
nfeasure.
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the
court's own observations during an inspection that it conducted without advance notice. 434 }.,. Supp. 1007 (1977).
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate population, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends
that these findings are erroneous.
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620'
cells, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day
,rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber
shop, and library. 2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field,
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described
this physical plant as "unquestionably a top-flight, first-class
facility." Id., at 1009.
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet.
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinettype night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent
near the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet,
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the·
5-6. Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at
SOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979).
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and was
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in
quality and quantity." 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id., at
i015. The c'o urt did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identify
them as · a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print:
shop, sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010.
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cells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can
be seen.
, The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m.
According to the District Court, " [ t] he day rooms are in a
sense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen
would seek in his living room or den." Id., at 1012. Each
day room contains a wall~mounted television, card tables,
anc;l chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the
day rooms during a IO-minute period each hour, on the hour,
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened.
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double celling them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term
sentences for first-<;legree felonies. Approximately 1,400 inmates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits,
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive
classification. 8
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed
Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate
their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their.
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and
newly arrived inmates awaiting classification had only 4 hours a week
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disciplinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a wee~ t9
!tj~d rel~io\\8 s~ices, a :m~v\e! ~r \~~ cp,IJJmiB§llf~~
8
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison population." Id., at 1014. The a,ir ventilation system was adequate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the
day rooms or visitation facilities,' nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the library or school rooms. 5 Although there were isolated incidents of failure to provide
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference
by the SOCF staff to in.mates' medical or dental needs. 0 As
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of violence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability offered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates
than jobs, had "water[ed] down" jobs by assigning more inmates to each job than necessary and by reducing the number of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it -also
found that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists·
and social workers since double celling had begun.
4 The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434·
F . Supp., at 1014.
5 The court found that adequate law books were available, even t<f· inmates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although' tnere was·
some delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id ., at
1015.
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but sll£stanti'al
backlog of inmates needing routine-' &ntal care, but the dental sta:Jr.·treated'
emergencies. Id., at 1016:

;
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Despite these generally favorable findings, the District
Court concluded ·t,hat double celling at SOCF was cruel and
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more inmates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." !rt
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding necessarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well
as physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid.
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standa.rds of decency several studies recommending that each person in an
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters;''
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square·
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner whO'
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a prac-·
tice; it is not a temporary condition. 9
7 The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27'
(1977) (60-80 square feet) ; National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jaff
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners,
§ 1 (50 square feet).
8 The basis of the District Court's assertion as to the amount of time
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the court's opinion.
Elsewhere in its opinion, the court found that 75% of the double celled
inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their cells from 6:30 a. m. to
9 p. m. 434 F . Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated that it mane this·
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate classification, which
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012.
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate,
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double ce'fling at ·
SOCF." 434 F. Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five pfans, each
of which the court rejected. It tl'lm ordered petitioners to ~ce tb·'
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sh,th Circuit,
petitioners argued that the District Court's conclusion must
be ,read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling
is per se unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals disagreed';
it viewed, the District Court's opinion as holding only that
double celling is cruel ~ncJ unusual punisp.ment under the
circumstances at ~OCF. It affirmed, with~ut further o,pinion, on the ground that the Pittrict Cou,:t's ijpdiQJS ·were
not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were '' 1parmissibl~
from the findings," and its remedy was a reasonable response
to the violations found.10
We granted the petition for certiorari because of ·the importance of the question to prison administration. - U. S.
- ( 1980 ). We now reverse.
II
We consider here for the first time the limitation that the
Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendmept, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S.
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State
may confine those convicted of crimes. It is unquestioned
that "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment standards."
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 669 (1977); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520 (1979). But until this case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the conditions of confinement at a' particula.r prison constituted cruel and unusual
punii;hment.11 Not have we had an occasion to consider speinmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population fell
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for
Cert., at A- 39.
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order
of affirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980) .
11 Irr Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978) , the state prison admin1s..
t rato'rs 'clid not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the condition~
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~ificl}Jly the pr.incipies relevant to assessing claims that contiitions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents f~r- the general principles that are relevant to a State's authtwity to impose punishmeJlt for, ~riminal conduct.

'•:

A
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words
''in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. 153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436
(1890) . Today the · Eighth · Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia,
supra, at 173, or are grossly · disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U, S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349
(1910) .12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of
pain are those that are "totally without penological justificain two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted pruel and
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison
brutality . . . is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976).
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can
be made criminal and punished as such. Robi™on v. California, 3'10
U. S. 660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is no~ involvetl
in this case.
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tion." Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Gambl6,
429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976).
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957)
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that
"Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [a court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182
(joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] should be .informed by objective factors to the maximum extent po~ible.'" Rummel v. Estelle, supra, at 275, quoting Coker. v.
Georgia,, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion) . For example,
when the question was whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, at 176- 187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593596 Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that deliberate indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the
common law and state legislatures, that "raJn inmate must
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." 429
U. S., at 103.
These principles apply when the conditions of confinement
compm:e the punishment at issue. Conditions cannot involve
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor can they
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime war-
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ranting imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble, S'W(>-11®, we held
that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual because,
in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and, even
in less serious cases, it can result in pain without any penological purpose. 429 U. S., at 103. In Hutto, supra, the
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons constituted
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivat:ons of basic human needs.
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or
in co~bination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cl'Uel
and unusual under the contempora.ry standard of decency
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103- 104. :But
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh,
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their o:ffenses against society.

B
In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its conclusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is insupportable. Virtually every one
of the court's findings tends to refute respondents' claim.
The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated in- ,
crease in prison population did not lead to deprivations of'
essential food, medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase
viole11ce among inmates or create other conditions intolerable
for prison confinemeut. 434 F. Supp. , at 1018. Although job
and educational opportunities diminished marginally as a
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay before
receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amend:.
ment from its language and history to hold that delay of'
tihe!e de.sirable aids t-o rehabilitation violates the Omstitution-,.

)
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion.
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of
several studies that each inmate have at least 50-55 Equare
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled inmates spend most of their time in their cells with their cellmates; and the fact that double celling at SOCF was not a
temporary condition . . Supra, at - . These general considerations fall far sh~rt in themselves of proving cruel and
unusual punishment, for there is no evidence that double
celling under these c'ircumstances either inflicts unnecesrnry
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of crimes w~.rranting · imprisonment. 13 At most, these considerations amount to a theory that double celling ·inflicts
pain.14 Perhaps they ·reflect an aspiration toward an ideal
13

t.

Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions

of experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U . S.,
at 543-544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional
minima; rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails
I (1980). 'Indeed, generalize<l opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude
toward a given sanction." 'Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint
opinion) . We could agree that double celling i,; not de;,irable, ei:ipeeially
in view of the size of these cells. But there is no evidence in thii:i ea,;e
that doublt' celling is viewed generally as violating decency. Moreover,
though small, the cells in SOCF are t:>.xceptionally modern and functional;
they are heated, ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and a
/!Sanitary toliet. Each cell also has a radio. 4:,4 F . Supp., at 1011.
14 Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for
· long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and
violence. In re_sp~ndents' view,_ it )VOUld b~ ~n infliction of unneces~ary
·a pd ·wanton pam 1f double cellmg 1ed to r1otmg. The danger of prison
riots is a serious concern, shared by the public as well as by prison au-

..
.......
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court. There being no constitutional violation, 15 the District Court had no authority to conthorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to the
conclusion that double celling at SOCF is cruel and unusual, whatever
may be the situation in a different case. The District Court's findings
of fact, lend no support to respondents' claim in this case. Moreover, a
prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 551, and
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119,
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
15 The dissenting opinion states that "the facility described by [the
Court] is not the one involved in this case." Post, at - . The incorrectness of this statement is apparent from an examination of the facts set
forth at, length above, see ante, 2-4, and nn. 2- 6, and the District Court's
detailed findings of fact . See 434 F. Supp., ·at 1009-1018.
In several instances, the dissent selectively relies on testimony without
acknowledging that the District Court gave it little or no weight. For
example, the dissent emphasizes the testimony of experts as to psychological problems that "may be expected" from double celling; it also
relies on similar testim~ny as to an increase in tension and aggression .
Id ., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and
physician that "there has been no increase [in violence] other than what
one would expect from increased numbers [of inmates]." Id., at 1018.
More telling is the fact-ignored by the dissent-that the District Court
resolved this conflict in the testimony by holding "that there had been
no increase in violence or criminal activity increase due to double celling;
there has been [an increase] due to increased population." Ibid. This
holding was based on uncontroverted prison records, required to be
maintained by the Ohio Department of Corrections and described by the
District Court as being "detail[edl and bespeak[ing] credibility." Ibid.
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court concerning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required to
remai11, 1n their cells. The dissent, post, at - , n. 6, relies tmly 011t

,·'

',
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sider whether double celling in light of these consideratiQns
was the best response to the increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population,

III
This court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth
Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, "[a] decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment," and thus "[r]evisions cannot be made in
the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georg,ia, 428 U. S.,
at 176. In assessing claims that conditions of confinement
are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their
inquiries "spring from constitutional requirements and that
selective findings that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours
each day, and that others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp.,
at 1013. The dissent fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly
inconsistent with a prior, twice-repeated, 'finding by the Court that inmates "have to be locked in their cell with their cellmate .only frorri
around 9:00 p. m. to 6:30 a. m.," id., at 1013, 1012, leaving them free to
move about for some 14 hours. Moreover; it is unquestioned-and also
not mentioned by the dissent-that the inmates who spend most of their
time locked in their cells are those who have a "restrictive classification."
These include inmates found guilty of "rule infractions [after} a plenary
hearing" and inmates wl1() "are there by 'choice' at least to some degree."
Ibid. It must be remembered tha.t SOCF is a maximum-security prison,
housing only persons guilty of violent and other serious crimes. It is
essential to maintain a regime of close supervision and discipline.
The dissent also makes much of the fact that SOCF was housing 38%
more inmates at the time of trial than its "rated capacity." According
to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three factors infiuence
prison population: the number of arrests, prosecution policies, and sentencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can change rapidly,
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to
calibrate a prison's "rated" or "design capacity" with predictions of
prison population. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae
3, 6. The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF
guessed incorrectly about future prison population, but whether the actual
conditi~11s of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual.

,.
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judicial anewere to them must reflect that fact rather than a
court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 539. 10
Courts do have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel
and unusual confinement, for conditions in some prisons,
especially older ones, have justly been described as "deploi'a-'
ble" and "sordid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562. When
conditions of confinement amount to cruel a.n d unusual punishment, "federal courts will discha.rge their duty to protect
constitutional rights." Procun-ier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396,
405-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972)
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility,
however, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how
16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974).
See generally, Na.tional Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails,
5 vols. (1980). It suffices here to repeat:
"rTJhe problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons,
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform . Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism." Id., at 405 (footnote
omitted).
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977).
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities.
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "topflight, first-class facility.'' Supra, at 2. Yet, an unanticipated increasein the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at
i:;sue,

~··
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best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal
justice system : t.o punish justly, to deter future crime, and
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens.
In this case, the question before us is whether the condi~
tions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we
find that they :are not, .the judgment of the Court of Appeais
is reversed.

. It is

30

ordered.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.

J\11 1 . ,

Today's decision reaffirms that "[c]ourts do haJ~e1cl'oula t ed : _ _ _ _ __
responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual
confinement."

Ante, at 12.

With that I agree.

I also agree

that the District Court's findings in this case do not support a
judgment that the practice of double-celling in the Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility is in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

I

write separately, however, to emphasize that today's decision
should in no way be construed as a retreat from careful judicial
scrutiny of prison conditions, and to discuss the factors courts
should consider in undertaking such scrutiny.

I

Although this Court has never before considered what prison
conditions constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see ante, at 6, such questions
have been addressed recurringly by the lower courts.

In fact,

individual prisons or entire prison systems in at least 23 States
have been declared unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment,l

~
~
~
,(

1 Among the States in which prisons or prison systems have
been placed under court order because of conditions of
con~inement in violation of the Eighth Amendment are: Alabama,
see Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd as
modified, 559 F.2d 283 (CA5 1977), rev'd in part of other
~rounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam): Arizona, see Harris v.
Caldwell, _ _ _ : Arkansas, see Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. 720

~--,. ~~~
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with litigation underway in many others.2

Thus, the lower courts

have learned from repeated investigation and bitter experience
that judicial intervention is indispensable if constitutional
dictates--not to mention considerations of basic humanity--are to
be observed in the prisons.
No one familiar with litigation in this area could suggest
that the courts have been overeager to usurp the task of running
prisons, which, as the Court today properly notes, is entrusted
in the first instance to "the legislature and prison

/

/~

(E.D. Ark. 1978): Colorado, see Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (CA
10 1980), cert. denied,
U.S.
(1981): Delaware, see
Anderson v. Redman, 429 ~Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977): Florida,
see Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975),
aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (CA5), vacated on rehearing on other
grounds, 539 F.2d. 547 (CA5 1976) (en bane), rev'd, 430 U.S. 325,
aff'd on remand, 553 F.2d 506 (CA5 1977) (en bane) (per curiam):
Georgia, see Guthrie v. Evans,
(S.D. Ga.): Illinois, see
Light f 00 t v . Wa 1 k er , 4 8 6 F . Su pp-:---SO 4 S . D . I 11 . 19 8 0) ( S . D . I 11 .
, 1980): Kentucky, see Kendrick v. Carroll, __ (W.D. Ky. __ ), and
\T hompson v. Bland,
(1980): Louisiana, see Williams v.
~awards, 547 F.2d 1206 (CA 5 1977): Maryland, see Johnson v.
Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d
1378 (CA4 1978), and Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 ( D. Md.
~1978), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378 (CA4 1978): Mississippi, see
Gates v. Collier, 501 F. 2d 1291 (CA 5 1974): Missouri, see Burks
v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1979): New Hampshire, see
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977): New York,
see Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48 (CA2 1977): Ohio, see (in
addition to this case) Stewart v. Rhodes,
(S.D. Ohio):
Oklahoma, see Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d~8 (CA 10 1977):
Oregon, see Capps v. At~ykh, 495 F. Supp. 802 (D. Ore. 1980):
Pennsylvania, see Hendrie v. Jackson, 309 A.2d 187 (1973): Rhode
Island, see Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 433 F. Supp. 956 (D. R.I.
1977), remanded, 599 F.2d 17 (CAl 1977): Tennessee, see Trigg v.
Blanton,
(state court): Texas, see Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.
Supp. 1265(5.D. Tex. 1980): Wyoming, Bustos v. Herschler (D.
Wyo.
) . See also Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14 (D.
P.~. 1980): Barnes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 415 F.
Su pp • 1218 (D • V • I • 19 7 6 ) •
2There are over 8,000 pending cases filed by inmates
challenging prison conditions. National Institute of Justice,
American Prisons and Jails, Vol. III (1980), at 34.
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administration rather than a court."

Ante, at 11.

And

certainly, no one could suppose that the courts have ordered
prisons," ibid., on the model of
To the contrary, "the soul-chilling inhumanity
American prisons has been thrust upon the
judicial conscience."

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.

Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D. Mass. 1973).
Judicial opinions in this area do not make pleasant
reading.3

/

For example, in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (N.D.

Ala. 1976), Judge Frank Johnson described in gruesome detail the
conditions then prevailing in the Alabama penal system.

The

institutions were "horrendously overcrowded," id., at 322, to the
point where some inmates were forced to sleep on mattresses
spread on floors in hallways and next to urinals.

Id., at 323.

The physical facilities were "dilapidated" and "filthy," the

3It behooves us to remember that
"it is impossible for a written opinion to convey the
pernicious conditions and the pain and degradation
which ordinary inmates suffer within
[unconstitutionally operated prisons]--gruesome
experiences of youthful first offenders forcibly raped;
the cruel and justifiable fears of inmates, wondering
when they will be called upon to defend the next
violent assault; the sheer misery, the discomfort, the
wholesale loss of privacy for prisoners housed with
one, two, or three others in a forty-five foot cell or
suffocatingly packed together in a crowded dormitory;
the physical suffering and wretched psychological
stress which must be endured by those sick or injured
who cannot obtain medical care ••.. For those who are
incarcerated within [such prisons], these conditions
and experiences form the content and essence of daily
existence." Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1391
(S.D. Tex. 1980).

-4-

cells infested with roaches, flies, mosquitoes, and other vermin.
Ibid.

Sanitation facilities were limited and in ill repair,

emitting an "overpowering odor": in one instance over 200 men
were forced to share one toilet.

Ibid.

Inmates were not

provided with toothpaste, toothbrushes, shampoo, shaving cream,
razors, combs, or other such necessities.

Ibid.

Food was

"unappetizing and unwholesome," poorly prepared and often
infested with insects, and served without reasonable utensils.
Ibid.

There were no meaningful vocational, educational,

recreational or work programs.

Id., at 326.

A United States

health officer described the prisons as "wholly unfit for human
habitation according to virtually every criterion used for
evaluation by public health inspectors."

Id., at 323-324.

Perhaps the worst of all was the "rampant violence" within the
prison.

Id., at 325.

Weaker inmates were "repeatedly

victimized" by the stronger: robbery, rape, extortion, theft and
assault were "everyday occurrences among the general inmate
population."

Id., at 324.

Faced with this record, the court--

not surprisingly--found that the conditions of confinement
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and issued a
comprehensive remedial order affecting virtually every aspect of
prison administration.4
Unfortunately, the Alabama example is neither abberational
nor anachronistic.

Last year, in Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (CA

4This Court has upheld the exercise of wide discretion by
trial courts to correct conditions of confinement found to be
unconstitutional. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-688 (1978).

~
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10 1980), cert. denied,

U.S.

(1981), for example, the

Tenth Circuit declared conditions in the maximum security unit of
the Colorado State Penitentiary at Canon City unconstitutional.
The living areas of the prison were "unfit for human habitation,"
id., at 567; the food unsanitary and "grossly inadequate," id.,
at 570; the institution "fraught with tension and violence,"
often leading to injury and death, id., at 572; the health care
"blatant[ly] inadequat[e]" and "appalling," id., at 574; and
various restrictions of prisoners' rights to visitation, mail,
and access to courts in violation of basic constitutional rights,
id., at 578-585.
of other cases.

Similar tales of horror are recounted in dozens
S e e , ~ , cases cited in note 1 supra.

Overcrowding and cramped living conditions are particularly
pressing problems in many prisons.

Out of 82 court orders in

effect concerning conditions of confinement in federal and state
correctional facilities as of March 31, 1978, 26 involved the
issue of overcrowding.

National Institute of Justice, American

Prisons and Jails, Vol. III, at 32 (1980).

Two-thirds of all

inmates in federal, state, and local correctional facilities were
confined in cells or dormitories providing less than 60 square
feet per person--the minimal standard deemed acceptable by the
American Public Health Association, the Justice Department, and
other authorities.5

5see American Public Health Association, Standards for
HeAlth Services in Correctional Institutions 62 (1976);
Department of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails 17
(1980); see generally National Institute of Justice, American
Prisons and Jails, Vol. III, at 59-60 & n.6.
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The problems of administering prisons within constitutional
standards are indeed "complex and intractable," ante, at 13,
n.16, quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974),
but at their core is a lack of resources allocated to prisons.

~

Confinement of prisoners is unquestionably an expensive
proposition: the average direct current expenditure at adult
institutions in 1977 was $5,461 per inmate, National Institute of
Justice, American Prisons and Jails, Vol. II, at 115 (1980): the
average cost of constructing space for an additional prisoner is
estimated at $25,000 to $50,000.

Id., at 119.

Oftentimes,

funding for prisons has been dramatically below that required to
comply with basic consitutional standards.

For example, to bring

the Louisiana prison system into compliance required a
supplemental appropriation of $18,431,622 for a single year's
operating expenditures, and of $105,605,000 for capital outlays.
Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1219-1221 (CA5 1977)

(Exhibit

A) •

Over the last decade, correctional resources, never ample,
have lagged behind burgeoning prison populations.

In Ruiz v.

Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), for example, the
court stated that an "unprecedented upsurge" in the number of
inmates has "undercut any realistic expectation" of eliminating
double- and triple-celling, despite construction of a new
$43,000,000 unit.

Id., at 1280-1281.

The number of inmates in

federal and state correctional facilities has risen 42% since
1975, and last year grew at its fastest rate in three years.
Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 Corrections 16, 16-17 (1981)

(report
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of annual survey of prison populations) .6

A major infusion of

money would be required merely to keep pace with prison
populations.
Public apathy and the political powerlessness of inmates
have contributed to the pervasive neglect of the prisons.

Chief

Judge Henley observed that the people of Arkansas "knew little or
nothing about their penal system" prior to the Holt litigation,
despite "sporadic and sensational 'exposes.'"
309 F. Supp. 362, 367 (E.D. Ark. 1970).

Holt v. Sarver,

Prison inmates are

"voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening."
Morris, The Snail's Pace of Prison Reform, Proceedings of the
100th Annual Congress of Corrections 36, 42 (1970).

Thus, the

suffering of prisoners, even if known, generally "moves the
community in only the most severe and exceptional cases."

Ibid.

As a result even conscientious prison officials are "[c]aught in
the middle," as state legislatures refuse "to spend sufficient
tax dollars to bring conditions in outdated prisons up to
minimally acceptable standards."
648, 654

Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp.

(D. Md.), aff'd in part, 588 F.2d 1378

(CA4 1978) .7

~

6Among the causes of· < rising number of prison inmates
are increasing populationf ~~creasing crime rates, stiffer
sentencing provisions, and more restrictive parole practices.
See Krajick, The Boom Resumes, 7 Corrections 16, 17 (1981);
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, The
National Manpower Survey of the Criminal Justice System, Vol.
III, at 13-14 (1978).
7Moreover, part of the problem in some instances is the
attitude of politicians and officials. Of course, the courts
should not "assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution," ante,
at 13 (emphasis added), but sad experience has shown that
sometimes they can in fact be insensitive to such requirements.
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After extensive exposure to this process, Judge Pettine came to
view the "barbaric physical conditions" of Rhode Island's prison
system as "the ugly and shocking outward manifestations of a
deeper dysfunction, an attitude of cynicism, hopelessness,
predatory selfishness, and callous indifference that appears to
infect, to one degree or another, almost everyone who comes in
contact with the [prison]."

Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp.

956, 984 (D. R.I. 1977), remanded, 599 F.2d 17 (CAl 1979).

--

--

Under these circumstances, the courts have emerged as a

------

critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions.
Insulated as they are from political pressures, and charged with
the duty of enforcing the Constitution, courts are in the
strongest position to insist that unconstitutional conditions be
remedied, even at significant financial cost.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

See Civil Rights of the Institutionalized, Hearings on S. 10
Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979)
(testimony of Asst. Attorney General Drew Days); Palmigiano v.
Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 671 (D. R.I. 1978) (prison officials
failed to implement court order for reasons unrelated to ability
to comply). William P. Nagel, a New Jersey corrections official
for 11 years and now a frequent expert witness in prison
litigation, testified in 1977 that, in every one of the 17
lawsuits in which he had participated, the government officials
worked in a "systematic way" to "impede the fulfillment of
constitutionality within our institutions." Civil Rights of the
Institutionalized, Hearings on S. 1393 Before the Subcommittee on
the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 772 (1977). He stated that he had "learned
through experience that most states resist correcting their
unconstitutional conditions or operations until pressed to do so
by threat of a suit or by directive from the judiciary." Id., at
779. Indeed, this Court recognized the problem of obstructionist
official behavior when it affirmed an award of attorney's fees
against Arkansas prison officials who had failed to comply with a
court order, on the ground that the litigation had been conducted
in bad faith. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689-693 (1978).

-9-

then serving on the Court of Appeals, set the tone in Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (CAB 1968): "Humane considerations and
constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured
or limited by dollar considerations

"

Progress toward constitutional conditions of confinement in
the nation's prisons has been slow and uneven, despite judicial
pressure.

Nevertheless, it is clear that judicial intervention

--------..

not only for remedying some of the worst
abuses by direct order, but for "forcing the legislative branch
of government to reevaluate correctional policies and to
appropriate funds for upgrading penal systems."

National

Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails, Vol. III), at
163.

A detailed study of four prison conditions cases by the

American Bar Association concluded:
"The judicial intervention in each of the
correctional law cases studied had impact that was
broad and substantial .... For the most part, the impact
of the judicial intervention was clearly beneficial to
the institutions, the correctional systems, and the
broader community. Dire consequences predicted by some
correctional personnel did not accompany the judicial
intervention in the cases studied. Inmates were
granted greater rights and protections, but the
litigation did not undermine staff authority and
control. Institutional conditions improved, but
facilities were not turned into 'country clubs.' The
courts intervened in correctional affairs, but the
judges did not take over administration of the
facilities." M. Harris & D. Spiller, After Decision:
Implementation of Judicial Decrees in Correctional
Settings 21 (1977).
Even prison officials have acknowledged that judicial
intervention has helped them to obtain support for needed reform.
Comptroller General, Report to Congress: The Department of
Justice Can Do More to Help Improve Conditions at State and Local

-10-

Correctional Facilities 12-13 (1980).

The Commissioner of

Corrections of New York City, a defendant in many lawsuits
challenging jail and prison conditions, has stated: "Federal
courts may be the last resort for us .•..

If there's going to be

change, I think the federal courts are going to have to force
cities and states to spend more money on their prisons ...•
look on the courts as a friend."
Prisons, 3 Corrections 3, 5 (1977).

I

Gettinger, "Cruel and Unusual"
In a similar vein, the

Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections,
testified before a Congressional committee that lawsuits brought
on behalf of prison inmates
"have upgraded correctional institutions and the
development of procedural safeguards regarding basic
constitutional rights. There is no question in my mind
that had such court intervention not taken place, these
fundamental improvements would not have occurred.

*

*

*

"While I do not intend to imply here that I sit
expectantly at my desk each week awaiting news of
another impending suit, I do recognize that unless my
agency consistently deals fairly with those
incarcerated in our institutions we will be held
judicially accountable." Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons, Hearings on S. 1393 Before
the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 409410 (1977) (testimony of Kenneth Schoen) .8
8After extensive hearings concerning the effect of court
litigation on the correction of unconstitutional conditions in
state-operated institutions, Congress emphatically endorsed the
role of the courts in the area by passing the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 346,
which authorized the Attorney General to bring suits in federal
court on behalf of persons institutionalized by the States under
unconstitutional conditions. The Conference Committee noted
thqt, as a result of litigation in which the Justice Department
had participated,
"conditions have improved significantly in dozens of
institutions across the Nation:
barbaric treatment
of adult and juvenile prisoners has been curbed; •••
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II
The task of the courts in cases challenging prison

\

conditions is to "determine whether a challenged punishmen't
comports with human dignity."
282 (1972)

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,

(BRENNAN, J., concurring).

?
I

Such determinations are

necessarily imprecise and indefinite, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958): Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-136 (1879):
they require careful scrutiny of challenged conditions, and
application of realistic yet humane standards.
In performing this responsibility, this Court and the lower
courts have been especially deferential to prison authorities "in
the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security."

Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979): see also ante, at 13, n.16:
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128
(1977): Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).

Many conditions

of confinement, however, including overcrowding, poor sanitation,
and inadequate safety precautions, arise from neglect rather than

and States facing the prospect of suit by the Attorney
General have voluntarily upgraded conditions in their
institutions ••• to comply with previously announced
constitutional standards." H.R. Rep. No. 897, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980).
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motivation to operate prisons within limits of decency.

Courts

must and do recognize the primacy of the legislative and
executive authorities in the administration of prisons; however,
if the prison authorities do not conform to constitutional
minima, the courts are under an obligation to take steps to
remedy the violations.

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405

(1973). 9
The first aspect of judicial decisionmaking in this area is
scrutiny of the actual conditions under challenge.

It is

important to recognize that various deficiencies in prison
conditions "must be considered together."
at 373.

Holt v. Sarver, supra,

The individual conditions "exist in combination; each

affects the other; and taken together they [may] have a
cumulative impact on the inmates."

Ibid.

Thus, a court

considering an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of
confinement must examine the totality of the circumstances.10

9see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 u.s. 319, 321 (1972):
"Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to
enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,'
including prisoners. We are not unmindful that prison
officials must be accorded latitude in the
administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners
necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and
regulations. But persons in prisons, like other
individuals, have the right to petition the Government
for redress of grievances which, of course, includes
'access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of
presenting their complaints.'" (Ci tat ions omitted.)
lOThe Court today adopts the totality of the circumstances
test. See ante, at 9 (Prison conditions "alone or in
combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure
of life's necessities.") (emphasis added). See also Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) ("We find no error in the
court's conclusion that, taken as a whole, conditions in the
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Even if no single condition of confinement would be
unconstitutional in itself, "exposure to the cumulative effect of
prison conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual
punishment."
N.H.

Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-323 (D.

1977).
Moreover, in seeking relevant information about conditions

in a prison, the court must be open to evidence and assistance
from many sources, including expert testimony and studies on the
effect of particular conditions on prisoners.

For this purpose,

public health, medical, psychiatric, psychological, penological,
architectural, structural, and other experts have proven useful
to the lower courts in observing and interpreting prison
conditions.

S e e , ~ , Palmigiano v. Garrahy, supra, 443 F.

Supp., at 960 (commenting that the Court's "task was made easier
by the extensive assistance of experts") .11
More elusive, perhaps, is the second aspect of the judicial
inquiry: application of realistic yet humane standards to the
conditions as observed.

Courts have expressed these standards in

various ways, s e e , ~ , M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447
F. Supp. 398, 404 (D. Mass. 1978)

("contemporary standards of

decency"): Palmigiano v. Garrahy, supra, 443 F. Supp., at 979
(conditions so bad as to "shock the conscience of any reasonable

isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.") (emphasis added) •
111 do not understand the Court's opinion to disparage use
of'experts to assist the courts in these functions. Indeed, the
Court acknowledges that expert opinion may be "helpful and
relevant" in some circumstances. Ante, at 10, n.13.
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citizen"): Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)
Jackson v. Bishop, supra, 404 F.2d, at 579)

{quoting

{"broad and

idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency").

Each of these descriptions has its merit, but in

the end, the court attempting to apply them is left to rely upon
its own experience and on its knowledge of contemporary
standards.12

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)

{plurality opinion): Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976)
{joint opinioin).
In determining when prison conditions pass beyond legitimate
punishment and become cruel and unusual, the "touchstone is the
effect upon the imprisoned."
Supp., at 323.

Laaman v. Helgemoe, supra, 437 F.

The court must examine the effect upon the

inmates of the condition of the physical plant {lighting, hea ,
plumbing, ventilation, living space, noise levels, recreation
space): sanitation {control of vermin and insects, food
preparation, medical facilities, lavatories and showers,
places for eating, sleeping, and working,): safety {protection
from violent, deranged, or diseased inmates, fire protection,
emergency evacuation): inmate needs and services {clothing,

12Again, the assistance of experts can be of great value to
courts when evaluating standards for confinement. Although
expert testimony alone does not "suffice to establish
contemporary standards of decency," ante, at 10, n.13, such
testimony can help the courts to understand the prevailing norms
against which conditions in a particular prison may be evaluated.
In this connection, the work of standard-setting organizations
such as the Department of Justice, the American Public Health
Association, the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, and
the National Sheriffs' Association is particularly valuable.
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nutrition, bedding, medical, dental, and mental health care,
visitation time, exercise and recreation, educational and
rehabilitative programming): and staffing (trained and adequate
guards and other staff, avoidance of placing inmates in positions
of authority over other inmates).
supra, 639 F.2d, at 567-581.

See ibid.: Ramos v. Lamm,

When "the cumulative impact of the

conditions of incarceration threatens the physical, mental, and
emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a
probability of recidivism and future incarceration," the court
must conclude that the conditions violate the Constitution.
Laaman v. Helgemoe, supra, at 323.

III
A reviewing court is generally limited in its perception of
a case to the findings of the trial court.

I have not seen the

Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville, nor have I
directly heard evidence concerning conditions there.

From the

district court opinion, I know that the prison is a modern, "topflight, first-class facility," built in the early 1970s at a cost
of some $32 million, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D. Ohio, 1977).
Judge Hogan, who toured the facility, described it as "not
lacking in color," and, "generally speaking, .•• quite light and
airy, etc."

Id., at 1011. The cells are reasonably well-

furnished, with one cabinet-type night stand, one wall cabinet,
one wall shelf, one wall mounted lavatory with hot and cold
•

running water and steel mirror, one china commode flushed from
inside the cell, one wall mounted radio, one heating and air
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circulation vent, one lighting fixture, and one bed.
1011.

Id., at

Prisoners in each cell block have frequent access to a day

room, which is "in a sense part of the cells," and is "designed
to furnish that type of recreation which an ordinary citizen
would seek in his living room or den."

Id., at 1012.

Food is

"adequate in every respect," and the kitchens and dining rooms
are clean.

Id., at 1014.

visitation.

Ibid.

Prisoners are all permitted contact

The ratio of inmates to guards is "well

within the acceptable ratio," and incidents of violence, while
not uncommon, have not increased out of proportion to inmate
population.

Id., at 1014-1015, 1016-1018.

are adequate.

Id., at 1014.

Plumbing and lighting

The prison has a modern, well-

stocked library, with an adequate law library.
1010, n.2.

Id., at 1010,

It has eight schoolrooms, two chapels, a commissary,

a barber shop, dining rooms, kitchens, and workshops.

Ibid.

Virtually the only serious complaint of the inmates at the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is that 1,280 of the 1,620
cells are used to house two inmates.
I have not the slightest doubt that 63 square feet of cell
space is not enough for two men.

I understand that every major

study of living space in prisons has so concluded.
Supp., at 1021: see also supra, at note
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting)~

See 434 F.

: post, at __

That prisoners are housed under such

conditions is an unmistakeable signal to the legislators and
officials of Ohio: either more prison facilities should be built
or expanded, or fewer persons should be incarcerated in prisons.
Even so, the findings of the District Court do not support a
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conclusion that the conditions at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility--cramped though they are--constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.

See Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 673-674 (CA 4

1977); M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, supra, 447 F. Supp.,
at 404-405.13
The "touchstone" of the Eighth Amendment inquiry is "the
effect upon the imprisoned."

Supra, at __ , quoting Laaman v.

Helgemoe, supra, 437 F. Supp., at 323.

The findings of the

District Court leave no doubt that the prisoners are adequately
sheltered, fed, and protected, and that opportunities for
education, work, and rehabilitative assistance are available.14
One need only compare the District Court's description of

13The District Court rested its judgment on five
considerations: (1) the long-term confinement of the prisoners,
(2) the rated capacity of the prison, (3) expert opinion of
living space requirements, (4) time spent in the cells, and (5)
the permanent character of the double-celling. This led the
Court of Appeals to conclude that the District Court had not
ruled the practice of double-celling "unconstitutional under all
circumstances." App. to Pet. for Cert., at A-2 (CA6, 1980). The
five considerations cited by the District Court, in my view, are
not ?eparate aspects of conditions at the prison; rather, they
merely embroider upon the theme that double-celling is
unconstitutional in itself.
14 The overcrowding in the cells is mitigated considerably
by the freedom of most prisoners to spend time away from their
cells, especially in the day rooms. The inhabitants of 960 of
the double-occupant cells were out of the cells some ten hours a
day at school, work, or other activities. 434 F. Supp., at 1013.
Of the remainder, all of whom spent six or fewer hours a week out
of the cells, some were on short-term "receiving status," some on
semi-protected status by choice, and some on "idle" status by
choice. Ibid. The remainder were in administrative isolation
because of infractions of the rules, determined after a plenary
hearing. Ibid.
• During trial in this case, and before final judgment by the
District Court, the prison implemented a plan limiting doublecelling to those inmates free to move about the facility 15 hours
per day. Brief for Petitioner, at 27.
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conditions at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility with
descriptions of other major State and federal facilities, see
supra, at __ , to realize that this prison, crowded though it is,
is one of the better, more humane large prisons in the nation.15
The consequence of the District Court's order might well be
to make life worse for many Ohio inmates, at least in the short
run.

As a result of the order, some prisoners have been

transferred to the Columbus Correctional Facility, a
deteriorating facility nearly 150 years old, itself the subject
of litigation over conditions of confinement and under a
preliminary order enjoining racially segregative and punitive
practices.

See Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. Ohio,

1979).
The District Court may well be correct in the abstract that
prison overcrowding and double-celling such as existed at the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility generally results in serious
harm to the inmates.

But cases are not decided in the abstract.

A court is under the obligation to examine the actual effect of
challenged conditions upon the wellbeing of the prisoners.16

The

District Court in this case was unable to identify any actual

1 5 rf it were true that any prison providing less than 63
square feet of cell space per inmate were a per se violation of
the Eighth Amendment, then approximately two-thirds of all
federal, state, and local inmates today would be
unconstitutionally confined. See supra, at __
16 This is not to sar that injury to the inmates from
challenged prison conditions must be "demonstrate[d] with a high
degree of specificity and certainty." Ruiz v. Estelle, supra
note 1, at 1286. Courts may, as usual, employ common sense,
observation, expert testimony, and other practical modes of
proof. See id., at 1286-1287.
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signs that the double-celling at the Southern Ohio Correctional
has seriously harmed the inmates there;l7 indeed, the Court's
findings of fact suggest that crowding at the prison has not
reached the point of causing serious injury.

Since I cannot

conclude that the totality of conditions at the facility offends
constitutional norms, and am of the view that double-celling in
itself is not per se impermissible, I concur in the judgment of
the Court.

17cf. Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 810-814 (D. Ore.
1980) (evidence "replete with examples of the deleterious effects
of overcrowding on prisoners' mental and physical health,"
including increased health risks, diminished access to essential
services, fewer opportunities to engage in rehabilitative
programs, levels of privacy and quiet insufficient for
psychological wellbeing, and exacerbated levels of tension,
anxiety, and fear); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp. 1105, 11121118 (D. Del. 1977) (court found that overcrowding had caused
severe physical and psychological damage to inmates, increased
the incidence of self-mutilation, suicide, attempted suicide,
th~ft, assault, and homosexual rape, destroyed all privacy,
overtaxed the sanitary facilities, exacerbated the problems of
filth, noise, and vermin, caused serious deterioration in medical
care, fostered increased idleness, broke down the classification
and incentive systems, and demoralized the staff).

6-2-81

6.t h DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA.DI
No.

80-332

· James A. Rhodes et al.,!
.
.
.
h
. d
Petitioners
On Writ of Certiorari to t e Umte
'
States Court of Appeals for the
v.
al
Sixth Circuit.
K e11y Chapman et .
[April -, 1981]
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the housing of two
ihmates in a single cell at the Southern Ohio Correctionai
Facility is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
JusTICE PoWELL

I
Respondents Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski are
inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF),
a maximum-security state prison in Lucasville, Ohio. ·Tliey'
were housed in ·the same cell when they brought this action
in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on
behalf of themselves and all inmates similarly situated at
SOCF. Asserting a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
they contended that "double celling" at SOCF violated the
Constitution. The gravamen of their complaint was that
double celling confined cellmates too closely. It also was
blamed for overcrowding at SOCF, said to have overwhelmed·
the prison's facilities and stafI.1 As relief, respondents
1 As a result of the judgment in respondents' favor, double celling has
been substantially eliminated at SOCF. But the increases in Ohio's statewide prison population, which prompted double celling at SOCF, have-'
continued. Furthermore, because SOCF is Ohio's only maximum-security
prison, the transfer of some of SOCF's inmates into lesser security prisonshas created special problems for · tlie recipient prisons. Tr. of Oral Arg..
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sought an in.iunction barring petitioners, who are Ohio offl..
eials responsible for the administration of SOCF, from housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary
measure.
The District Court made extensive findings of fact about
SOCF on the basis of evidence presented at trial and the
tourt's own observations during an inspection that it conducted without advance notice. 434 }~. Supp. 1007 (1977).
These findings describe the physical plant, inmate population, and effects of double celling. Neither party contends
that these findings are erroneous.
SOCF was built in the early 1970's. In addition to 1620
Mlls, it has gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, "day
rooms," two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber
11hop, and library. 2 Outdoors, SOCF has a recreation field,
visitation area, and garden. The District Court described
this physical plant as "'1nquestionably a top-flight, first-class
facility." Id., at 1009.
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet.
Each contains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinettype night stand, a wall-mounted sink with hot and cold
running water, and a toilet that the inmate can flush from
inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered
bunk bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent
nea.r the ceiling, and 960 of the cells have a window that
inmates can open and close. All of the cells have a cabinet,
shelf, and radio built into one of the walls, and in all of the
~- Thus, petitioners have an interest in resuming double celling at
BOCF. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 542-543, n. 25 (1979).
2 SOCF's library contains 25,000 volumes, including law books, and waS
described by the District Court as "modern, well-lit," and "superior in
quality and quantity." 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (1977). The court
described SOCF's classrooms as "light, airy, and well equipped." Id ., at
.1015. The court did not describe SOCF's workshops except to identifythem as a laundry, machine shop, shoe factory, sheet metal shop, print
shop, sign shop, and engine-repair shop. See id., at 1010.
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~ells one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can
be seen.
The "day rooms" are located adjacent to the cell blocks
and are open to inmates between 6: 30 a. m. and 9: 30 p. m.
According to the District Court, " [ t] he day rooms are in a
eense part of the cells and they are designed to furnish that
type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen
would seek in his living ·room or den." Id., at 1012. Each
day room contains a wall-mounted television, card tables,
and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and theday rooms during a IO-minute period each hour, on the hour,
when the doors to the day rooms and cells are opened.
As to the inmate population, the District Court found that
SOCF began receiving inmates in late 1972 and double celling them in 1975 because of an increase in Ohio's state-wide·
prison population. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300·
inmates, 67% of whom were serving life or other long-term
eentences for first-degree _felonies. Approximately 1,400 inmates were double celled. Of these, about 75% had the
choice of spending much of their waking hours outside their
cells, in the day rooms, school, workshops, library, visits,
meals, or showers. The other double celled inmates spent
more time locked in their cells because of a restrictive
classification. 3
The remaining findings by the District Court addressed
respondents' allegation that overcrowding created by double
celling overwhelmed SOCF's facilities and staff. The food ·
was "adequate in every respect," and respondents adduced
no evidence "whatsoever that prisoners have been underfed
a Inmates who requested protective custody but could not substantiate
'their fears were classified as "limited activity" and were locked in their·
cells all but 6 hours a week. Inmates classified as "voluntarily idle" and
newly arrived inmates awaiting ·classification had only 4 hours a week
outside their cells. Inmates housed in administrative isolation for disciplinary reasons were allowed out of their cells for 2 hours a week to,.
•tt~nd · religious services, a mwi'e, "or the commissary.
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or that food facilities have been taxed by the prison population." Id., at 1014. The air ventilation system was adequate, the cells were substantially free of offensive odor, the
temperature in the cell blocks was well controlled, and the
noise in the cell blocks was not excessive. Double celling
had not reduced significantly the availability of space in the
day rooms or visitation facilities/ nor had it rendered inadequate the resources of the libra.r y or school r~oms.~ Although there were isolated incidents of failure to provide
medical or dental care, there was no evidence of indifference
by the ,SOCF staff to inmates' medical or dental needs. 0 As
to violence, the court found that the number of acts of violence at SOCF had increased with the prison population, but
only in proportion to the increase in population. Respondents failed to produce evidence establishing that double celling itself caused greater violence, and the ratio of guards to
inmates at SOCF satisfied the standard of acceptability offered by respondents' expert witness. Finally, the court did
find that the SOCF administration, faced with more inmates
than jobs, had "water[ ed] down" jobs by assigning more inmates to each job than necessary and by reducing the number of hours that each inmate worked, id., at 1015; it alsofound that SOCF had not increased its staff of psychiatrists
and social workers since double celling had begun.
• The court noted that SOCF is one of the few maximum security
prisons in the country to permit contact visitation for all inmates. 434
F. Supp., at 1014.
6 The court found that adequate law books were available, even to inmates in protective or disciplinary confinement, to allow effective access
to court. As to school, no inmate who was "ready, able, and willing to
receive schooling has been denied the opportunity," although there was·
1omo delay before an inmate received the opportunity to attend. Id ., at
1015.
6 Turnover in the dental staff had caused a temporary but substantial
backlog of inmates needing routine dental care, but the dental staff treated'
emergencies. Id., at 1016.

'.

'·

80--832-0PINION
RHODES v.CHAPMAN

Despite these generally favorable findings, the District
Court concluded that double celling at SOCF was cruel and
unusual punishment. The court rested its conclusion on five
considerations. One, inmates at SOCF are serving long terms
of imprisonment. In the court's view, the fact "can only
accent[uate] the problems of close confinement and overcrowding." Id., at 1020. Two SOCF housed 38% more inmates at the time of trial than its "design capacity." In
reference to this the court asserted, "Overcrowding necessarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well
as physical and mental injury from long exposure." Ibid.
Three, the court accepted as contemporary standards of decency several studies recommending that each person in an
institution have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters. 7
In contrast, double celled inmates at SOCF share 63 square
feet. Four, the court asserted that "[a]t best a prisoner who
is double celled will spend most of his time in the cell with
his cellmate." 8 Five, SOCF has made double celling a practice; it is not a temporary condition. 0
r The District Court cited, e. g., American Correctional Assn., Manual
of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard No. 4142, p. 27
(1977) (60-80 square feet) ; National Sheriffs' Assn., A Handbook on Jail
Architecture 63 (1975) (70-80 square feet); National Council on Crime
and- Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners,
§ 1 ( 50 square feet).
8 The baF'is of the Distrirt Court's assertion as to the amount of time
that inmates spend in their cells does not appear in the rourt's opinion.
Elsewhere in its opinion, the court found that 75% of the double celled
inmates at SOCF are free to be out of their ceJls from 6:30 a. m. to
0 p. m. 434 F . Supp., at 1012, 1013. The court stated thnt it made this
finding on the basis of prison regulations on inmate cla ~sification, which
petitioners submitted as exhibits. Id., at 1012.
9 Rather than order that petitioners either move respondents into single
cells or release them, as respondents urged, the District Court initially
ordered petitioners to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to formulate,
propose, and carry out some plan which will terminate double celling at
SOCF." 434 F . Supp., at 1022. Petitioners submitted five plans, each
of which the court rejected. It then ordered petitioners to reduce the-
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OJ) p,ppeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit\
petitipners argued that the 'District Court's conclusion must
be read, in light of its findings, as holding that double celling
is per se unconstitutional. ·The· Court of Appeals disagreed;
it viewed the District Court's opinion as holding only that
double celling is cruel and unusual punishment under the
circumstances at SOCF. It affirmed, without further opinion, on the ground that the District Court's findings were.
not clearly erroneous, its con"ciusions of law were "permissible
from the findings," and its rem·edy was a reasonable response
to the violations found. 10
We granted the petition for certiorari because of the imU. S,
portance of the question to prison administration, (1980). We now reverse.

II
We consider here for the first time the limitation that theEighth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson V. California, 370 u. s.
660 (1962), imposes upon the conditions in which a State
may confine those convicted of · crimes. It is unquestioned"
tha~ "[c]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment
subject _to scrutiny under the_Eighth Amendment standards.""
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 685 (1978); see Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, ·669 (1977); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 5:20 (1979). But until this case, we have not considered a disputed contention that the conditions of confinement at a particular prison constituted cruel and unusuar
punishment. 11 Nor have we had an occasion to consider speinmate population at SOCF by 25 men per month until the population·fell
to the prison's approximate design capacity of 1700. App. to Pet. for
Cert., at A-39.
10 The Court of Appeals stated its conclusion in a two-paragraph order·
of !lffirmance that it filed but did not publish. 624 F. 2d 1099 (1980).
11 In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), the state prison adminis-tratiifs did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the conditiODfJ'

;
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.,

·eifically the principles relevant to assessing claims that conditions o'f confinement violate the Eighth Amendment. We
look, first, to the Eighth Amendment precedents for the general principles that are relevant to a State's authority to im.,_
pose pupishmept for criJUinal cenctuct.
A
The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be
"cruel and unusual." The Court has interpreted these words
"in a flexible and dynamic manner," Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U. S. '153, 171 (1976) (joint opinion), and has extended the
Amendment's reach beyond the barbarous physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases. See Wilkerson
v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436
(1890). Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, "involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," Gregg v. Georgia,
8Upra, at 173, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Coker v. Georgi,a, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349
(1910). 12 Among "unnecessary and wanton" inflictions of
pain are those that are "totally without penological justificain two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.,
at 685. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), the question was
whether corporal punishment in public school constituted cntel and
unusual punishment. We held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to public school disciplinary practices. In considering
the differences between a prisoner and a schoolchild, we stated, "Prison
bnttality . .. is 'part of the total punishment to which the individual is
being subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.'" Id., at 669, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525
F. 2d 909, 915 (CA5 1976).
12 The Eighth Amendment also imposes a substantive limit on what can
be made criminal and punished as such. Robin.son v. California, 370·
U.
660 (1962). This aspect of the Eighth Amendment is not involved
in this case.

s:
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tion/¥ Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 183; Estelle v. Garnble~
.f29 u. s. 97, 103 ( 1976).
No static "test" can exist by which courts determine
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1957)
(plurality opinion). The Court has held, however, that
"Eighth Amendment judgments shodd neither be nor appear
to be merely the subjective views" of judges. Rurnmel v.
Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 275 (1980). To be sure, "the Con1titution contemplates that in the end [a corrt's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability" of a given punishment. Coker v. Georgia, supra, at
597 (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182·
{joint opinion). But such "'judgment[s] should be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible.'" Rurnmel v. Estelle, supra, at 275, quoting Coker v.
Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion). For example,
when the question was whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated contemporary values, the Court looked
for "objective indicia" derived from history, the action of
state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries. Gregg v.
Georgia, supra, at 176-187; Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 593596. Our conclusion in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, that deliberate ·indifference to an inmate's medical needs is cruel and
unusual punishment rested on the fact, recognized by the
·common law and sta.te legislatures, that "r a]n inmate must
rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the
authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met." 429
U. S., at 103.
·These principles apply when the conditions of confinement
compose the pu11ishme11t at issue. Conditions must not in-·
volve the wanton and unnecesrnry infliction of pain, nor may
thi'y be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
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warranting imprisonment In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, we
held. that the denial of medical care is cruel and unusual be-.
cause, in the worst case, it can result in physical torture, and ,
even ii1 less serious cases, it can result in pain without any
penological purpose. 429 U. S .. at 103. In Hutto, supra, the
conditions of confinement in two Arkansas prisons constituted
cruel and unusual punishment because they resulted in unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs.
Conditions other than those in Gamble and Hutto, alone or·
in combination , may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measme of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel
and unusual under the contemporary standard of derency
that we recognized in Gamble. 429 U. S., at 103-104. But
conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under·
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh,
they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.
B

In view of the District Court's findings of fact, its conclusion that double celling at SOCF constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is ingupportable. Virtually every one
of the court's findings t~nds to refute respondents' claim.
The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison population did not lead to deprivations of
essential food , medical care, or sanitation. Nor did it increase
violence among inmates 01' create other conditions intolerable
for prison confinement. 434 F. Supp., at 1018. Although joband educational opportunities diminished marginally as a
result of double celling, limited work hours and delay beforereceiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary
and wanton pain; deprivations of this kind simply are not
punishments. We would have to wrenrh the Eighth Amendment from its language and history to hold that delay of
these desirable aids to rehabilitation violates the Constitution,
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The five considerations on which the District Court relied
also are insufficient to support its constitutional conclusion.
The court relied on the long terms of imprisonment served
by inmates at SOCF; the fact that SOCF housed 38 % more
inmates than its "design capacity"; the recommendation of
several studies that each inma.te have at least 50-55 square
feet of living quarters; the suggestion that double celled inmates spend most of their time· in their cells with their cellmates; and the fact that. double celling at SOCF was not a
temporary condition. Supra, at - . These general considerations fall far short in themselves of proving cruel and
unnsual punishment, for there· is no evidence that double
celling under these circumstances either inflicts unneces~ary
or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of crimes warranting imprisonment. 18 At most, these considerations amount to a theory that double celling inflicts
pain. 14 · Perhaps they reflect an aspiration toward an idea1
13 Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming that opinions
of experts as to desirable prison conditions suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency. As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S.,
at 543.:.544, n. 27, such opinions may be helpful and relevant with respect
to some questions, but "they simply do not establish the constitutional
minima; rather, they establish gonls recommended by the organization in
question." See Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and · Jails
1 (1980). Indeed, generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily
in determining contemporary standards of decency as "the public attitude·
toward a given sanction." Gregg v:' Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173 (joint
opinion). We roukl agree that double celling i,- not desirable, especial!~·
in view of the 8ize of these cells. But there is no evidrnce in thi8 case
that double celling ii:: viewed generally a:; Yiolaling d2cency. Moreover,
though small , the erlh, in SOCF are exceptional!~, mo<lern and functional;
they are heated, ventilated, havp hot and cold running water, :rntl. a
sanitary tolirt. En<'h cell 11!1:,:i has a radio. 434 F. Supp., at 1011.
14
Respondents contend that the close confinement of double celling for
long periods creates a dangerous potential for frustration, tension, and"
violence. In respondents' view, it would be an infliction of unnecessary
and wanton pain if double celling led to rioting. The <larger of prison·
·riots is a serious concern, shared by the public 11s well as by prison au-
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environment for long-term confinement. But the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons of
SOCF's type, which house persons convicted of serious
crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court. There being no constitutional violation, 15 the District Court had no authority to con~
thorities and inmates. But respondents' contention does not lead to the
eonclusion thnt double celling at SOCF is cruel and um1sual, whatever
may be 1he si1 nation in a different, case. The District Court.'s findings
of fort lrnd no i;upport to re:spondents' claim in this case. Moreover, a
prison's internal security is peculiarly a mattrr normally left to the discretion of prison administrators. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra. at. 551, and
n. 32; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Unum. 433 U. S. 119,
132-133 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 827 (1974).
15 The dii;:scnting 011inion states that "the facility described by [the
Court1 is not the one involved in this case." Post, at - . The incorrectness of this statement is apparent from an examination of the facts set
forth at, lrngth ahove, see ante, 2-4, and nn. 2- G, and the District Court's
detailed findings of fact. See 434 F. Supp., at 1009-1018.
In several instances, the dissent selectively relies on testimony without
acknowledging that the District Court gave it little or no weight. For
example, the dissent emphasizes the testimony of experts as to rsychological problems that "may be expected" from double celling; it also
relies on similar testimony as to an increase in tension and aggression.
Id ., at 1017. The dissent fails to mention, however, that the District
Court also referred to the testimony by the prison superintendent and
physician that "there has been no increase [in violence] other than what
one would expert from increased numbers [of inmates]." Id., at 1018.
More telling is the fact-ignored by the dissent-thflt the District Court
resolved this c•onflict in the testimony by holding "that there hftd been
no increflse in violence or criminal activity increase due to double celling;
there has been fan increase] due to increased population." Ibid. This
holding was bnsed on uncontroverted prison records, required to be
maintainrd by the Ohio Department of Corrections and desrribed by the·
District Court as being "detail[ed] and bespeak[ing] credibility." Ibid.
There is some ambiguity in the opinion of the District Court concerning the amount of time that double celled inmates were required to·
remain in their cells. The disse11t, post, at - , n. 6, relies only on
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1ider whether double celling in light of these considerations
was the best response to the · increase in Ohio's state-wide
prison population.

III
This court must proceed cautiously in making an Eighth
Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, "[a] defision that a given punishment is impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment cannot pe reversed short of a constitutional amendment," and thus "[r]evisions cannot be made in
the light of further experience." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S.,
at 176. In assessing claims that conditions of confinement
are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that their·
inquid.es "spring from constitutional requirements and that
aelective findings that most inmates are out of their cells only 10 hours
each day, and that others are out only 4-6 hours a week. 434 F. Supp.,
at 1013. The dissent fails to note that the first of these findings is flatly
inconsistent with a prior, twice-repeated, finding by the Court that inmates "have to be locked in their cell with their cellmate only from
around 9:00 p. m. to 6:30 a. m.,'" id ., at 1013, 1012, leaving them free to
move about for some 14 hours. Moreover, it is unquestioned-and also
not mentioned by the diesent-that the inmates who spend most of their
time locked in their cells are those who have a "restrictive classification."
These include inmates found guilty of "rule infractions [after] a plenary
he11ring" and inmates who "are there bv 'choice' at least to some degree."
foi,d. It must be remembered that. SOCF is a ma.ximum-security prison,
housing only persons guilty of ·violent and other serious crimes. It is
tsSential to maintain a regime of close supervision and discipline.
The dissent also makes much of the fact that SOCF was housing 38%
more inmates at the time of trial than its "rated capacity." According·
to the United States Bureau of Prisons, at least three factors influence
prison population: the number of arrests, prosecution policies, and sentencing and parole decisions. Because these factors can change rapidly,
while prisons require years to plan and build, it is extremely difficult to
calibrate a prison's "rated" or "design capacity" with predictions of"
prison population. Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Cwiae
3, t . The question before us is not whether the designer of SOCF"
guessed incorrectly about future prison population, but whether the actual"
conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual.
d 1;1

'I
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judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a
court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility." Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 539. 16
Courts certainly have a responsibility to scrutinize claims of
cruel and unusual confinement, and conditions in a number of
prisons, especially older ones, have justly been described as
"deplorable" and "sorbid." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 562.17
When conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual
punishment, "federal courts will discharge their duty to protect
16 We have sketched before the magnitude of the problems of prison
administration. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 404-405 (1974) .
See generally, National Institute of Justice, American Prisons and Jails,
5 vols. (1980). It suffices here to repeat:
"rT]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons,
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of
prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflecb no more thau a healthy Hense of realism ." Procuuier v. Martinez,
:mpra, al 405 (footnote omitted).
See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 561-562, 568 (1974); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U. S. 119, 125 (1977).
Since our decision in Martinez, the problems of prison population and
administration have been exacerbated by the increase of serious crime
and the effect of inflation on the resources of States and communities.
This case is illustrative. Ohio designed and built SOCF in the early
1970s, and even at the time of trial it was found to be a modern "topflight, first-class facility." Supm, at 2. Yet, an unanticipated increasein the State's prison population compelled the double celling that is at
issue.
17 Example:; of recent federal court decision,- holding pri:,mn conditions
to be violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment:; include Ramus
v. Lamm, 639 F. 2d 559 (CAl0 1980), cert. denied, U.S. (1981) ;
Williams v. Edwards. 547 F. 2d 1206 (CA5 1977); Gates , . Collier, 501
F. 2d 1291 (CA5 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Sup., 318 (MD Ala. 1976),
aff'd as modified, 559 F . 2d 288 (CA5 1977), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiarn).
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constitutional rights." Procunwr v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 3961
~05-406 (1974); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972)
(per curiam). In discharging this oversight responsibility,
however, courts cannot assume that state legislatures and
prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how
best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal
justice system: to punish justly, to deter future crime, and
to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
chance of being useful, law-abiding citizens.
In this case, the question before us is whether the conditions of confinement at SOCF are cruel and unusual. As we
find that they are not, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.
It is 30 ordered.
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
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Re: No. 80-332 - Rhodes v. Chapman
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your separate concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss

6/13/81

80- 332 Rhodes v. Chapman

This case is here on a writ of certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

It concerns the

conditions of confinement/at a state maximum security
prison,/ the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility.

-

The question is whether the housing of two inmates
in one cell - a practice known as double-celling - is cruel
and unusual punishment/ in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The facts are not in dispute.

The prison/

completed in 1972 ,/is one of the most modern/and best
equipped in the United States.

The double-celling problem

aroso/because of an unanticipated increase in Ohio's prison
population.
At the time of trial, 1,400 inmates - out o~ a

total of 2,300 - were double-celled.

0'3

-

~~
The cells
Asmall

for double occupancy, being 63 square feet.

Yet, they are

exceptionally modern and functional; they are heated, ~
ventilated, have hot and cold running water, and sanitary
toilets.

Each cell has its own radio.

...

•

2.
The courts below nevertheless held / that this
..... ·'

double-celling constitued cruel and unusual punishment.

We think such a holding goes beyond any prior
decision of this Court.

The standard / established by our

cases/ is that the Constitution is not violated/u nless the
punishment is gross ? aisproportionate/ to the severity of
the crime }gf involves the wanton/ and unnecessary infliction
of pain.

The facts in this case/ fall far short of meeting

this standard.
Federal courts ar-;-'s ensitive to their dut/ to
,"

scrutinize carefully/ claims of cruel and unusual
confinement.

Conditions in many prisons, especially older

ones, have been held to be intolerable.

But this is not

such a case.

',

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, has filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Blackmun also has filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion.
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N~ iimt s COURT ALLOWS TWO /
Jun t t to I qq,, IN ACELL FOR ONE
------

-~

'

..

1

Continued From Pa1e Al .

r;:; ....

if!__igh Courf Rules

· ,. ble-celllng had led to an increase in vio. . · • : ·__
.;.· 1ence.
1
,. "There is no evidence," he continued,
-~~ "that double-celling under thele circum: stances either lnfllcts iµineceuary or
::;, wanton pain or, is groaly disporportion~ ate to the severity of crimes warrantins
"'! ·,
_;.imprisonment.'.' '
/
,., Conclusiona to the contrary; Justice
- Powell said. perhaps "1'9fiect an aspira_... tion toward an ideal environment for
: __long-term confinement.'' But he added:
I '. · · "The Constitution do8I not mandate com.:
:;;: fortable prisons."
- · The case, Rhodes v. Chapman, No. 80By lJNDA GREENHOUSE ·
'. ,: ·· Special!O'Ibel'fawYcnnm.
,:'', ~ -: 332, was the first Supreme Court case to
WASHINGTON, June 15 - The ' su:;· - - -analyze conditions of confinement, as op.. posed to the sentence itself, under the
preme Court ruled today that two prisoners may be confined in a cell designed for ..:.· ·~Eighth Amendment. It attracted wid&only one as long as _the overall prison 7 spread attention from groups concerned
with prisoners' rights and from such orconditions do not violate a "contempo.
ganizations as the American Medical A!r
rary standard of decency._''
sociation and the American Pubtic
The ~ l decision overturned rulings
Health Association.
' by two Federal courts in Ohio, where ·
• Together, the associations filed a brief
1,400 inmates at the state's maximum se-- __telling
the Court that a "broad consensus
curity prison were required to double up ::·of epidemiological, medical and psychoin 63-square-foot cells designed to house
"·:1og1cal findings" supports a minimum re- ·
oneperson.
: --quirementof 60 square feet per prisoner.
In another case dealt with today, the
:;~ Because two-thirds of allfederal, state
..,-and local prisoners in the country are
Court unanimously upheld the constitu: .·confined in less space than that proposed
tionality of the Federal strip mining law
,,.; minimum, a ruling by the Court that the
as Interior Secretary J ~ G. Watt was
~~Constitution forbids doubl~elllng or retaking action to cut back the staff of the
quires 60 square feet per person would ·
agency that is-charged with enforcing it.
have had a substantial dislocating effect
[PageB9.Jon the nation's prisons.
The Court also ruled unanimously that
Since the Court today left open the posrecent Federal health planning legislasibility that double-<:elling might be unconstitutional in a different setting, the
tion designed to end the construction of
decision is unlikely to end litigation over
.excess hospital beds did DOt leave private
prison conditions. Prison conditions in
insurers free to refuse to deal with hospitwo dozen states have been ruled uncontals they regard as surplus or unneces.
stitutional by various Federal and state
sary. (PageDl.J
-courts, for the most part on the basis of a
I
liumber of factors in addition to doubl&Prison Called 'Top-Flight'
,ulllng. Such decisions based on a "totalIn the Ohio prison case, the lower
,.lty of the circumstances" analysis would
courts had ruled that the doubllng up con: .~ unaffected by today's ruling.
stituted cruel and unusual punuhment,
. :
;J;
which _is prohibited by the Eighth AmendFive for Majority Opinion
ment of the Constitution.
four members of the Court joined
Writing for the majority today, AssociJustice Powell in his opinion: Associate
., ate Justice Lewis P. Powell Jr. said that
Justices Potter Stewart, Byron R. White
and William H. Rehnquist and Chief Ju,.
"whatever may be the situation in a diflice ·warren E. Burger, who has made
ferent case" the lower courts' application
-several recent speeches deploring prison
of the Eighth Amendment to the Ohio
,j:ondit1ons. .
.
prison was "insupportable."
• Associate Justice Wllliam J. Brennan
He· said that the ~year-old prison,
:Jr. filed a separate concurring opinion, in
the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
which he was joined by Associate Jusat Lucasville, had been found by the Fedtices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul
eral District Co'Jl1 to be "unquestionably
SteVens. . • · ·
a tOI>fligbt. first.class facility," with
_ The only dissenting Justice, Thurgood
adequate food. medical care, sanitation
. - "Marshall, warned that the majority optn.
and llbrary resources. There was no eviion could be a "step toward abandoning"
the Federal courts' important role in
dence, Justice Powell said, that the dousafeguarding the protections of the
'
Cootmued on Pap Bt, Column 1
Eighth Amendment.
- Other actions by the Court today in.!_:eluded_these: , ;

T~ _May BeP,ut
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Pl~ ~f Cru~l Punuhme~t
In Ohio Prucin Re)ected ,
••

•

•

#

~

>l

;._,__ Only

L : · , :-

..

,/ :!,,,

•

.,

Right to Travel ·. -' ,,.._ ·
The Justices unanimously upheld a
Georgia law that made the abandonmf!Dt
of a child a more serious offense if the
abandoning pa.rent left the state iestead I
of remaining in Get:qla. The Georgia s~ ,
preme Court had found the law constitutional, but the United States Court of A~
:pea1s for the Fifth Circuit struck it down
on the ground that it lnfrtngecl the fundamental constitutional right to interstate
travel.
.
- Justice Stevens wrote the decision.·
Jones v. Helms, No. 80-850. He said that
while the right to travel was a tundamen. tal right in ordinary circumstances, the
"criminal conduct" of the defendant in
today's case "necesaarlly qualified his
right thereafter fn!ely to travel interstate." The defendant, Bobby Helms,
failed to pay for the support of his daughter and moved to Alabama.

Information Release
The Court agreed to hear an appeal by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation from
a rul~ that information collected for
law enforcement purposes loses its exemption from disclosure if it ls later used
for other purposes.
The case, F.B.I. v. Abramson, No. 801735, involves documents that were forwarded by the agency to aides to President Nixon. The documents concerned
various political opponents of the Nixon
Administration. They were requested by
Howard S. AbraD19011, now a freelance '
journalist, under the Freedom of Infor-J
matlon Act, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia
lrdered them disclosed on the groundj
hat the original exemption of investiga-1
1ry records no longer applied. In its Su-!
,·:eme Court appeal, the F.B.I. is arguing
1,_.at the ruling compromises the personal
_>r.lvacy of those involved.

Aff.mnative 'Action
Til\~ Court declined to hear challenges
to aft: lrmative action plans adopted by
the cil.'.ies of Detroit and Seattle to
crease .minority representation in their
uniform,!!d services. Both cases had
pending at the Court for nearly 18
months. '- The Justices gave no explana-1
tion for n1fuslng to hear the cases, Maehren v. Seat::tle, No. 79-1061, and Detroit Police Office1~ ~ - v. Young, No. 79-1080.
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Quotation of the Day.
"The Corutttution does not mandate .
comfortable prisons:"'. - Associate
Justtce Lewis
F. Powell Jr. [B9: l.J
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Richmond Times Dispatch, June 24, 1981

Prisone.r' s' Rights

Most · Americans undoubtedly ,
view with approval the _U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision
that it is not "cruel and unusual .
punishment" to place two prisoner!!
in one cell.
.
Two inmates of the Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility filed suit on
the grounds that "double-celling" :
violated their constitutional rights
under the Eighth Amendment. A ·
federal district court decided in';;
their favor, and that decision was .
sustained by a federal appeals .
tribunal. But eight of the nine inem- ~
bersof the U .S.,SupremeCourtfound /
no constitutional violation.
1
Writing for himself and four other, , '
members, Justice Lewis F. Powell
Jr. said that conditions of confinement "must nQt involve the wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain,
nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
warranting imprisonment." But, he
said, "to the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even
harsh, they are part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society."
Federal judges who sometimes
have been going to the extreme in
mandating changes in state penal
operations sho~1ld take note of a bit of

.

advice which Justice Powell seemed
to be aiming in their direction. The
courts do have a responsibility to
scrutinize claims of cruel 'and uriusual confinement:declared,Justice
Powell, but "in discharging this
oversight responsibility, however, ·
courts cannot assume that state
legislatures and'prison officials are
insensitive to the requirements of
the Constitution or to th~ perplexing
sociological problems of ho_w best to
achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system:
to punish justly, to deter future
crime, and to return imprisoned persons to society with an improved
chance of being useful, law-abiding
citizens ."
Three justices· who agreed with
the judgment in the case filed a
separate concurring opinion "to
emphasize that today's _decision
should in no way be construed as a
retreat from careful judicial
scrutiny of prison conditions .... "
The decision may not represent a
"retreat," but it may have an influence on lower court judges when
they consider the multitude of complaints from prisoners (more than
8,000 cases are pending) alleging
violations of their constitutional
rights.

